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This thesis is mainly concerned with local interest
articulation in Shanghai in the early 1980s in the areas of its
economic development strategy and financial autonomy. While a
large proportion of our analysis is given to examining the unique
conditions in Shanghai that gave rise local interest articulation,
its characteristics and impact on policy, we also try to exploit
the analytical opportunities afforded by this case to shed light
on. (1) the character and the nature of local interest
articulation in Chinese politics and (2) what types of impact
local interest articulation (or more generally the subordinate
levels) are likely to have and the conditions under which it can
exercise such impact.
Interest articulation in Shanghai in the rirst hair or iyous
is seen as shaped by two conditions: Shanghai's extremely
asymmetrical position with respect to its economic relation to the
central government, and the ambivalent attitude of the central
government. The latter. should be stressed because, in
consideration of the nature of Chinese political system, the
causes for local autonomy and power should at least be sought
partially in the conditions at the central level.
Because of the limitations to research, we focus only on the
more open expression and articulation of local interest, and as a
result of this, the focus of our analysis is not the conventional
actors in central-local politics (the formal provincial leading
cadres), but the lesser prominent elites, particularly the
intellectuals. Local interests were articulated through seemingly
scholarly analysis of policy problems. Very often, local actors
found it necessary to frame local interests in terms of broad
national interests and this seems to be the rule of the game.
However, sometimes local demands were expressed in very partisan
manner.
The analysis of the impact of local interest articulation
invites the perplexing problems of measuring influence,
particularly to measure influence in a state of poor knowledge
about the policy-making process. Irrespective of these general
difficulties, we propose that local interest articulation had
influenced policy outcomes, by demonstrating, (1) importance of
local initiatives as suggested by the chain of events, and (2) the
close similarity of the demands in Shanghai and the policy
content. However, the methodological defects of these conclusions
should be kept in mind.
Local interest articulation snould be seen as of more
political significance than its immediate impact on the policy
issue at hand. The articulation of interest over a particular
issue would likely to have spill-over effect and unintended
consequences. From a' long term perspective, the accumulative
effect of interest articulation would lead to a more fundamental
change of the political system.
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Administratively speaking, Shanghai is just one of the
provincial level units 1 in the People's Republic of China: it is
one of the three cities under the direct jurisdiction of the
central government which enjoy an organizational status equivalent
to a province. However, Shanghai's position in China far exceeds
that of an average province. Many, observers have contended that
Shanghai occupies a conspicuous position both in Chinese politics
and in its economy. The thesis concerning Shanghai's importance in
i
Chinese politics is open to doubt for two reasons. First, what
usually referred as Shanghai connection or the Shanghai Gang
in Chinese politics seems to be an exception rather than a rule.
Second, it is very questionable to equate the influence of the
2
Gang of Four with that of Shanghai in national politics. On the
other hand, the city's economic importance has been unambiguous.
The total industrial output value of Shanghai accounts for more
than 10% of China's nationaltotal, and in the late 1970s and the
early 1980s, Shanghai's industrial products were in great demand
in China. The volume of industrial products shipped out from
Shanghai made up over 40% of the total inter-provincial transfersi
3
of industrial commodities in China.
Shanghai's development since the communist takeover
represents the most typical example of Chinese government s policy
4
of transforming the consumption city to production city. As
China's most important industrial centre, Shanghai has been
required to support China1 national economic development in two
ways: to accumulate investment funds and to supply better quality
industrial products for other parts of China. These two roles have
put Shanghai in a very difficult situation. Most of the revenue
earned in Shanghai has been drained by the centre and the city was
forced to meet (and over-fulfil) the output value and profit
targets assigned by the central government. Since these targets
were raised annually, Shanghai was kept busying fulfilling these
requirements by unceasingly tapping unused potentials. Very
damaging consequences for the city's development flow from these
policies. On the one hand, since most of the revenue recorded in
Shanghai has been taken away and most of the capital has been
invested in capital construction and developing new industries,
only very limited amount of capital was left for technological
transformation and upgrading. On the other hand, the one-sided
emphasis on industrial development has caused many problems for
the people's livelihood. The service sector dwindled substantially
and the expansion of the industrial production has worsened the
conditions of the city, for examples.
Contrary to the common expectation that Shanghai would be
able to benefit from the new economic strategy which emphasizes
the priority of the coastal region, Shanghai was still placed in a
very difficult situation. In 1979, the municipal Party Committee
set three central tasks for Shanghai. It was said that Shanghai
should be an advanced industrial sector, an export centre and a
centre of supporting the internal area. Although Shanghai
received more investment as a result of the emphasis of production
beginning from mid-1970s, the fundamental issues that work to
Shanghai's disadvantage have not been removed. While formerly
Shanghai's development was inhibited by the central government's
determination to develop the inland area, in the early 1980s, the
central government's concerns for maintaining stability in
economic reforms have put Shanghai in similarly disadvantageous
position. More decisive change in central government's policy
toward Shanghai did not come until late 1984.
With the central government's approval of Shanghai municipal
government's Outline of Report Concerning Shanghai's Economic
Development Strategy in February 1985, Shanghai's economic and
social development entered into a new phase. A new economic
development strategy was adopted, and as part of this new
strategy, the municipal government would be given a larger share
of the revenue produced in Shanghai. This event was really
remarkable for Shanghai because it was meant to relieve Shanghai
from the heavy burdens it had been forced to shoulder in the past.
While formerly Shanghai was basically required to play the role of
an industrial city, the new economic development strategy
maintained that Shanghai should become an economic centre, a
multifunctional municipality. In the place of output value and
profit values, it was said that from then on Shanghai would be
evaluated mainly in terms of its Gross National Product, which
i
means that the non-material production sectors should be given
greater emphasis. At the same time, improving the livelihood of
the people of Shanghai and increasing municipal construction were
also greatly emphasized.®
This research focuses not on the policy substances
themselves, but on the process leading to these changes and tries
to exploit the analytical opportunities it affords to shed light
on the more general issues in Chinese politics. Two dimensions of
the process leading (or prior and related) to the policy changes
in 1985 will be examined. The first dimension is the central
government's perception of and policy towards Shanghai, and the
second one is concerned with the activities surrounding the issue
of Shanghai's economic development strategy at the local level.
Although the emphasis of this research is on the second dimension,
it is necessary to analyse the issue from the perspective of the
central government because the emergence of local interest
articulation in Shanghai seemed to have been heavily influenced by
central government's perception. To underscore this
characteristics, we should first of all give attention to the
attitude of the central government. Moreover, the process with
which the central government came to a resolution on Shanghai's
economic development strategy is itself interesting: it provides
an suitable case for understanding the central government's
strategy in the reform era.
The change of Shanghai's economic development strategy and
the decentralization of financial power were preceded by a
lengthened process of discussion of Shanghai's economic
development strategy in the municipal level. Its extremely
unfavorable position had become the source of local grievances
and much had been said and acted on this subject matter quite
openly in the early 1980s. For lack of proper term, and also for
comparative purpose. this process is here referred as local
interest articulation. This process provides valuable analytical
opportunity to study the nature, characteristics and the
influence of local interest articulation in Chinese politics. More
specifically, we are interested in the following questions. What
was the basis of local interest articulation in Shanghai? Under
what circumstances did it occur? What are the major
characteristics of this interest articulation in Shanghai. What
impact did it have on the policy development later? Answers to
these questions would enable us to propose some general hypotheses
about the occurrence of interest articulation activities, its
nature and its influence in Chinese politics. In turn these will
contribute to more adequate understanding of the nature of the
power of the local level in Chinese politics. While the uniqueness
of this case does not allow us to say much regarding what power
the local level actually has in Chinese politics in general, the
analysis about the conditions for local power should have
implication beyond this single case.
CHAPTER TWO
GENERAL BACKGROUND AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S STRATEGY
This chapter tries to suggest the following points. First, as
early as the beginning of the 1980, the central government began
to reconsider Shanghai's economic development strategy. Second,
there was a gap between perception and action in central
government's policy toward Shanghai. Third, this gap can best be
explained by the preponderant significance of Shanghai to the
national economy and the central government strategy to economic
reforms. While these points can stand in their own right, they are
presented here mainly to underscore the fact that local interest
articulation in Shanghai was in part encouraged by the central
government's ambivalent attitude to Shanghai. Before proceeding
directly to these points, let us first briefly note the importance
of Shanghai to the Chinese national economy. As to be seen in the
following, this has paradoxically worked to Shanghai's
disadvantage and prevented the central government to adopt
decisive measures to solve the problems faced by the economy of
Shanghai.
(1) Shanghai's Economic Position in China
A convenient starting point for appreciating Shanghai's
economic position in China is the proportion of its GI0V in the
national total. Table 2.1 demonstrates that Shanghai's total GI0V
constitutes a large proportion of the total GI0V of China. In
1982, it stood at 11.3. As of 1985, this stood at 10%. Though the
importance of Shanghai's industry has constantly declined in
recent years as a result of the gap between Shanghai's growth rate
and that of other more prosperous provinces, Shanghai is still
undeniably China's largest and most important industrial city.
This, however, only begins to suggest the municipal's unique
importance. Of greater importance is that the productivity of the
Shanghai enterprises in general much higher than the national
average level, so that of each unit of GIOV, the percentage of
profit and tax is higher than the national average level. It was
said that in 1979 the per capita productivity of the workforce of
Shanghai was 150% higher than the national average, and the profit
achieved by every unit of fixed asset was four times higher than
the national average. Therefore,Shanghai's revenue alone made
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up 16% of the total state revenue.
Shanghai's large share in the state revenue by no means fully
reveals Shanghai singular significance. The State revenue (guojia
caizheng) can be broken into two parts: central government revenue
(zhongyang caizheng) or more properly central government
expenditure (zhongyang zhichu) and local revenue (difang caizheng)
or more properly local expenditure (difang zhichu). The
terminological differences of these terms should be clearly made.
State revenue (guojia caizheng) represents the total revenue
available to government at all levels. Central government revenue
(zhongyang caizheng) represents both the revenue collected
directly by the central government and the revenue transferred
from the provincial levels. Local revenue means the revenue
collected by the subnational governments minus the remittance to
the central government. Therefore, one easily underestimates the
financial power of the central government if he just look at the
share of revenue directly collected by it. Table 2.2 compares the
proportion of the revenue directly collected by the central
government and the proportion of its expenditure in state revenue.
It is clear that from 1980 on, the central government has been
able to control about a half of the total state revenue.
To indicate the importance of Shanghai, two other sets of
figures are certainly more revealing. One is the percentage of
Shanghai's remitted revenue to the total revenue remitted to the
central government by various provinces. Another is the percentage
of Shanghai's remitted revenue of the total revenue available to
the central government (counted as central government
expenditure). Tables 2.3a and 2.3b presents figures on these
aspects. These statistics fully suggest Shanghai's unique
importance to the coffer of the central government.
There are of course other indicators that equally suggest
Shanghai's importance to the national economy. For example,
Shanghai's export accounted for 23.34% (nearly a quarter) of
China's total export in 1980. Although this proportion had
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declined gradually, it still stood at 16.4% in 1983. For another
example, many Shanghai consumer goods had been heavily demanded by
the consumers in other provinces. This is indicated by the share
of commodities transferred from Shanghai in the total
4
interprovincial transfer in the whole country. However, for
this research purpose we should put special emphasis on Shanghai's
crucial importance to the financial situation of the central
government because this is the key variable in shaping Shanghai's
relations with the central government in the early 1980s.
Shanghai's relationship with the central government deviates
greatly from the norms in the post-Mao era. It was certainly an
exception to such characterization that the provincial
government's economic power had gained at the expense of the
central level. As Donnithrone reported, while the provinces were
said to retain 80% of the local revenue in 1982, Shanghai, along
with Beijing and Tientsin, was allowed to retain a much smaller
proportion. Moreover, Shanghai's share was much lower than those
5
of Tientsin and Beijing. In the early 1980s, the central
g
government drained nearly 90% of Shanghai's revenue. When the
new financial management system which in effect amount to
financial decentralization was introduced in 1980, these three
directly-ruled cities were excluded.
Many important implications flow from this fiscal relations
between Shanghai and the central government. One of the most
important of these is that Shanghai's industrial output value and
profit were required to grow incessantly. Therefore, Shanghai's
economy was demanded to ensure a certain speed of growth (yiding
zhudu). For example, when Shanghai's industrial output value and
profit fell as a result of the readjustment measures in the first
7
seven months of 1981, this alarmed the central government. In
response to this situation, Zhao Ziyang, then Prime Minister of
the State Council, visited Shanghai in July to make clear the
Q
demand of the central government upon shanghai. Therefore,
industrial enterprises in Shanghai were asked (or forced) to
greatly raise their production in the rest of 1981. 9
Particularly, it was required that the seventeen major consumer
goods should increase 12% to absorb currency. 10 Obviously as a
result of this intense effort to enforce the new tasks assigned by
the central government, production and profit rose greatly in
October. 11 This case demonstrates very well that from Shanghai's
financial relationship with the central government flows very
important consequences for the functioning of the economy of
Shanghai, not merely because the municipal level was left with
small finance, but also because Shanghai was tied to the current
tasks and was not allowed to solve the structural imbalances built
in its economy.
(2) The Central Government's Perception of The Problems of
Shanghai
The only elaborated discussion of Shanghai's economic
problems was an article published in RMRB in April 1980. The
article was authored by the Shanghai survey subgroup of the
12
Economic Structure Group under the State Council. The Economic
Structure Group was one of the Four research groups organized by
the Finance and Economics Committee of the State Council in June
13
1979 to investigate the economic problems of the country. The
Economic Structure Research Group was led by Ma Hong who at that
moment played important role in the State Council. Later, the
research findings and policy recommendations were published in a
14
two volumes book under the editorship of Ma and his associate.
Because of the nature of this research group, we can take the
ideas expressed in this article on Shanghai's problems as
15
expressing central government s position.
The article was titled How to Bring into full Play the Role
of the Industrial Centre, Shanghai. Five major problems in
Shanghai's economic development were singled out. Firstly, it
pointed out that Shanghai's economy was overburdened that it had
no room for readjustment and repayment of the debts in production
and livelihood. Therefore, it suggested that the burden of
Shanghai should be reduced and there should be a long term plan
governing its economic development. Secondly, this article called
for changing the internal structure of Shanghai's industry. The
big and comprehensive (da erchuan) feature of Shanghai's
industrial structure was said to be working against Shanghai's
strong points. And it stated further that the development of high
energy-consumption industries in Shanghai had worsened the
difficulty in energy supply and transport, and had inhibited the
development of light industries. It was recommended that Shanghai
should emphasize technology intensive and new industries. Thirdly,
it suggests that more emphasis should be placed on upgrading and
transforming the technological level of Shanghai's industrial
enterprises, especially the enterprises in the light and textile
industries. It is thought that this is not only of critical
importance to upgrading products in the direction of higher,
sophisticated and advanced quality, but also necessary for
ensuring Shanghai's industry to grow at certain rate.
The fourth question is concerned with the negative impact of
mere emphasis on production in since 1949 on Shanghai's municipal
construction and on the people's livelihood. It was said that the
construction and transformation of the city had come to a critical
stage. This problem was related to a crucial aspect in central-
Shanghai economic relations: it was admitted that city
construction and transformation required financial resources, and
it thus demanded that more financial resources should be left to
the municipal level. Fifthly, it called for more rapid export of
Shanghai's technology and management techniques to other
provinces.
To a large extent, the problems identified by this important
article are really the problems with Shanghai's economy and many
of its recommendations were akin to the solutions adopted later.
However, there were important differences. In the first place,
this article did not envision that Shanghai should become a
multifunctional city, to be a financial centre, a technology
centre and an information centre etc. other than being just an
industrial centre. Secondly, it did not anticipate the rapidly
changing conditions in the supply of light and textile industrial
products which was to have great impact on Shanghai's development
and which should be included in any consideration of its long term
development strategy. As a result, light industry was still
heavily emphasized in this article.
Nevertheless, this article published in April 1980 indicated
that Shanghai's economic problems had aroused serious concerns in
the central level. It was reported that as early as 1980, the
central government was drafting concrete measures to solve these
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problems.
Apart from this direct comment on Shanghai's economic
problems, it can be argued that the signal sent from Shanghai
should arouse the concerns of the central government over
Shanghai s economic problems. As pointed out previously, when
Shanghai's industry and revenue dropped drastically in the first
half of 1981, Zhao Ziyang immediately visited Shanghai in July to
put Shanghai back in the right track. In the period between 1981
and 1983, although Shanghai's gross industrial output value was
able to grow, the tax and profit stood roughly at the same level,
indicating that the cost of production was on the rise. Table 2.4
compares the national GIOV growth rate with that of Shanghai
during 1979-1985. Table 2.5 indicates that the total value of
Shanghai's export declined substantially after reaching a peak in
1980. All these indicators unambiguously signal that Shanghai's
economy was not doing well at that moment.
In Table 2.6, the growth rates of Shanghai's gross industrial
output value and municipal revenue in these years are compared.
These figures indicate that the municipal revenue did not grow
with the rise in industrial output value. This means that the
profit level of Shanghai's industrial enterprises was on the
decline. As a result, there had been frequent expression of
concerns over the situation that industrial output and revenue did
not grow at the same rate (zengcan buzengshou or zengcan yu
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caizheng shouru butong bu) in Shanghai in 1983. Although these
concerns were not expressed directly by the central leaders, they
can be fruitfully be taken as also representing the concerns of
the central government. In fact, Yao Yilin's visit to Shanghai in
January 1983 was probably related to the incompatible growth of
18
output value and revenue in 1982
(3) Xll§ Strategy of Renovating the Old Enterprises
Then we can move to show that the solution to Shanghai's
problems later is quite in line with the overall economic
strategies. One of such overall development strategy that has had
great impact, if a somewhat delayed one, on Shanghai was the
decision to slow down the rate of growth and to shift the emphasis
from the construction of new enterprises and production facilities
in the past to renovating the old enterprises. In 1979, the
Economist Sun Yefang published an article on the Red Flag (Hongqi)
calling for raising the depreciation rate of the enterprises and
19
putting more emphasis on old enterprises. In retrospect, it is
quite obvious that later policy development has been significantly
shaped by Sun's views on the urgency of renovating old
enterprises. His ideas and suggestions had found way into central
20
government policy in 1981 and 1982. The priority of
technological transformation of the old enterprises over capital
construction had been strongly emphasized. In his Government Work
Report submitted to the Fourth Plenary of The Fifth NPC, Zhao
Ziyang made strengthening technological transformation and making
full use of the existing enterprises one of the ten policy lines
21
(fangzhen) in China's economic construction. Later this also
22
went into the Report on the Sixth Five Year Plan.
Economic result, rather than higher growth rate, now became
the catchword. 23 For example, Zhao Ziyang said in his speech to
the National Work Conference of Industry and Transport in March
1982 that the main problem at present is not the neglect of
output value, but the neglect of economic result, and the
essence of the State Council's ten policy lines in economic
construction is to raise economic result. 24 But what is better
economic result? A very simple definition was given: better
economic result was ensured as long as the industrial enterprises
produced the goods demanded by the consumers and the markets, i.e.
consistent with the needs of society. 2 The main purpose of this
line of emphasis was to reduce excess in supply which was then
piling up. However, better economic result can refer to other
things. Among these, it may refer to making best use of the
regional strong points and evade its own weaknesses. As pointed
out in the RMRB article cited before, it may mean consuming less
raw material and fuel, producing goods with more added values.
It is germane to point out how this shift in development
strategy in the national level has been relevant to Shanghai. An
immediate effect of this on Shanghai has been the sudden increase
of funds for technological upgrading and transformation in
Shanghai since 1982, as can be seen from Table 2.7. The renovation
of Shanghai's industrial enterprises was given very high priority;
Wang Daohan indicated that the State Council asked Shanghai to go
a step ahead. In the last three years of the Sixth Five Years
Plan, the central government arranged three thousand advanced
technology import projects for the whole country. Of these,
more than five hundreds or one sixth of the total, had been given
to Shanghai and were to be arranged solely by the municipal
government. 28 Shanghai set up a technological renovation leading
group at about the same time, and Wang Daohan indicated later
that of these imported items about a half was given to machine
building and electronic industries. The total foreign exchange
used for import in Shanghai has increased substantially since
1983. However, it must be noted that this emphasis on
enterprise renovation alone did not bring about decentralization
immediately. Although more technological upgrading and
transformation funds have been designated to Shanghai, the basic
central-Shanghai relationship did not change very much. As a
result of this, these newly available funds for enterprise
renovation, as evident from last chapter, did not achieve their
original purposes. Under the great pressure of output value and
profit targets, both the enterprises and the economic leadership
in Shanghai simple did not have the motivation to use these
resources for the purposes they were supposed to serve.
Therefore, it can be shown that within the central
government's policies during the first half of 1980s toward
Shanghai was an stark inconsistency. A consideration of this
inconsistency suggests more questions and dilemma concerning the
central government's policies toward Shanghai's economic
development. On the one hand the central government seemed to have
arrived at a conclusion that Shanghai's rapidly obsolete but still
profitable enterprises should be renovated, the technological
level of these enterprises should be brought closer to the
international standard, and its overall industrial structure
should be considerably readjusted to accommodate with the
vulnerability of Shanghai's economy. It seemed to be also the
central government's objective that there would be a division of
labour between the coastal and the inland regions, and between the
industrially advanced and the backward regions. Shanghai, and
other relatively advanced regions as well, should move to higher
quality products and increase its export. This would not only
increase China s foreign exchange earning, but also reduce the
friction between Shanghai and other provinces whose industries
were rapidly developing and had strong incentives to grasp a share
in the profitable consumer goods market.
It can be reasoned that the achievement of these objectives
requires at least two conditions: 1) the availability of
renovating funds and resources and accompanying power and 2) both
the industrial enterprises and the municipal leadership must have
the incentive to do these. In the case of Shanghai, while
beginning from as early as the late 1970s more funds for
technological upgrading and transformation had been provided for
Shanghai, the second condition was not provided. The effective
inhibiting factor was the central government's continuing
insistence on having Shanghai industrial output value and profit
grow unstopped annually. As a result of this, both the municipal
leadership and the enterprises had neither the power (ability) nor
the incentive to make better use of these funds. It was widely
reported that the majority of the investment under the name of
technological upgrading and transformation had been devoted to
increase production capacity, rather than to raise the
technological level and to develop new and higher quality
32
products.
(4) Central Government's Approach to Economic Reforms
How can we explain this inconsistency? In fact, the article
written by the Economic Structure Group in 1980 recognized very
well that if a structural transformation of Shanghai's economy is
to be accomplished, the first thing should do was to reduce the
output value and profit pressure on Shanghai. Then why there
has been such an inconsistency. Two speculative explanations (not
mutually exclusive) can be advanced. First, this might be due to
lack of coordination among the central ministries and actors. The
designation of more investment to Shanghai was probably thought as
a matter of course after the priority of these objectives had been
established. However, the fundamental change of central-Shanghai
relationship would require more bureaucratic cooperation and works
as well as a more lengthened consensus building process. It is
thus reasonable to expect that this would be slow to come.
However, another explanation is also plausible. This
inconsistency might very well stem from the central government's
strategy to economic reforms during this period. Therefore,
instead of focusing on the lack of coordination among the central
bureaucracies,we should also be aware of the possibility that this
might be the result of the conscious choice on the part of the
central government. It is interesting to compare the situation of
the three directly-ruled municipal with the situation of large and
medium size industrial enterprises. In retrospect, it is quite
clear that the small size enterprises were given more autonomy and
flexibility much earlier than the medium and large size
enterprises. Zhao Ziyang stressed that this was the strategy of
the central government in his Government Work Report in the Third
Plenary of the Sixth NPC in March 1985: 'Our economic structure
reforms have forwarded with plan and step by step. During the
previous several years, we first focused on livening up the
economy in the rural areas, then moved to give the small
enterpiises more autonomy, leaving the large and medium size
enteiprises with heavier responsibility in revenue remittance and
in production with mandatory planning. In a sense, in the previous
several years the cities had supported the reforms in the rural
areas and the large enterprises had supported the reforms of the
small enterprises.... With the economic development and the
strengthening of the financial power of the state, we ought to
gradually raise the problem of further livening up the large and
medium size and key bone enterprises to agenda. 1
It was quite obvious that the central government's position
with regard to central-Shanghai relations was similar to its
position with large and medium size enterprises. This view was
also held by many Chinese scholars. In a conference preceding the
central government's decision to loosen its control over Shanghai,
many scholars traced the overcentralized control over Shanghai to
its overwhelming importance to the stability of the national
economy. For example, Tong Dalin, a noted economist in China,
stated that stability was the main principle of the central
government governing the central-Shanghai relationship. In an
article calling for experimenting overall and synchronized
economic reforms in Shanghai, the author also pointed out that
Shanghai was following central government's guideline of
emphasizing mainly on stability. And it was also stressed that
as a consequence of tight central control, Shanghai suffered least
from the macroscopic loss of control. Zhao Ziyang also stated that
Shanghai had made big contribution to economic reforms in China.
The central government's strategy to economic reforms matches
very well with the expectation of the organizational theorists on
organizational behaviour under the condition of uncertainty.
Here the central policy-makers are seen as intendedly rational but
seeking to cope with the uncertainties that might arise from
economic reforms. In his analysis of the evolution of the scheme
of expanding enterprise autonomy, Lee demonstrated that the
policies closely resembled those in the early 1960s. He then
suggested that this adherence to the policy precedence could be
explained as the policy-makers' attempt to reduce uncertainty in
the policy-making process. The incremental character of the
economic reform process is thus given a rationale. Our analysis
is similar to Lee's but refers to different phenomenon. We also
emphasize that economic reforms are highly risky and the central
leaders were concerned with minimizing the risks and uncertainties
of economic reforms. Given the fact that economic reforms in the
early 1980s focused mainly on revenue redistribution (between the
central government and the local government and between government
and enterprise), the central policy-makers were particularly
concerned with the condition of the state revenue, especially with
that of the revenue under the direct jurisdiction of the central
government.
As a matter of fact, state and central revenue are the
technical cores of the economy 40 and these areas have proved to
be most vulnerable to economic decentralizations, as testified by
the experiences in 1979 and 1980. The determined measures on the
part of the central government to slow down the pace of economic
reforms and to freeze revenue in late 1980 was obviously a
response to the alarming financial situation in 1979 and 1980 when
the level of financial deficit was mounting, (see Table 2.8). 41
Several reasons explain why the situation of the state revenue has
been a crucial consideration in the making of economic reform
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policies. The financial situation of the central government
would affect its ability to ensure minimal stability of the
national economy; it would also affect the ability of the central
government to continue to undertake its expected obligations in
such areas as controlling inflation, providing price subsidies and
providing services in other functional spheres. Moreover, the
financial power of the central government would greatly affect the
ability of the central government in economic planning. For
example, without adequate financial resource, the central
government could hardly make use of economic tools to overcome the
parochial tendency of the localities and to ensure the economy to
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move at a direction as desired by the central policy-makers.
Another reason for placing the state's revenue situation in a
central position is that a balanced revenue is simply perceived to
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be crucial to the national economy.
In view of the perceived importance of maintaining a certain
level of central government revenue and ensuring a balanced
finance, and also in view of the preponderant share of Shanghai's
revenue in the total state and central government revenue (Tables
2.3a and 2.3b), it is only very natural for the central government
to keep Shanghai (and to a less extent Tientsin and Beijing as
well) under tight control. As in the case of large and medium size
enterprises, the central government had resorted to control
several key sources of revenue in order to reduce the risks and
the uncertainties in implementing economic reforms. Therefore, the
three directly-ruled municipalities were not included in the
decentralization package in 1980. Donnithrone correctly
observed in 1981 that with the introduction of the new financial
management system in 1980, the central government relied more on
the three directly-ruled municipalities for revenue. As a
result, Shanghai's strength paradoxically worked to its
disadvantage in the reform era.
(5) The Financial Situation of the Central Government as a
Governing Factor
It follows from the foregoing analysis of central
government's strategy to economic reforms that the crucial factor
governing central-Shanghai economic relations had been its
emphasis on securing a stable source of revenue for the central
government. This explains why in 1981 when the state's financial
situation was particularly acute (or perceived to be so) in 1980,
Shanghai was pressed more than any time else to turn in more
revenue. This perhaps also explains why while it was recognized
that Shanghai's financial burden should be considerably relieved
and a reconsideration of the old economic development strategy was
necessary, the concrete measures were slow to come. If the
foregoing analysis is correct, the improved financial situation of
the central government should contribute to the development of
Shanghai's new economic strategy and the decentralization of
financial power.
There were many signs that the financial situation was
improving. In CPC's proposal for drafting the Seventh Five Year
Plan (1986-1990), It was declared that the objective of seeking
for the fundamental improvement of the state's financial and
economic situation had been realized. In his government work
report to the Third Plenary session of Sixth NPC, Premier Zhao
Ziyang noted that because of the better financial situation, China
should put the issues of expanding the autonomy of the large and
medium size enterprises up to the agenda.
Table 2.8 presents the quantitative data on the financial
situation of China from 1979 to 1985, showing that the deficits of
the state revenue was falling from the highest level in 1979 and
1980. In 1985, the balance was turned into a surplus of 2,160
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million yuan.
It should be noted that in Table 2.8 we are only able to
present data on the changes in state revenue and expenditure; it
does not tell us about the situation of the revenue of the central
government. However, it is highly possible that with the
introduction of Tax-for-Profit scheme and other measures to
stabilize the sources of revenue, the central government's revenue
might be more secure than they had been in the past and its
dependency upon the three directly-ruled municipal had been
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lessened. Unfortunately, we do not have data on this problem.
(6) Summary
In this chapter, we have gone into some length to see
Shanghai's problem from the perspective of the central government.
It is found that the central government's early policy to Shanghai
was marked by a stark inconsistency. We also suggest that action
has also lagged behind perception. These are then seen as shaped
by the central government's emphasis on buffering the technical
core of the national economy: the state revenue, or more
precisely the revenue available to the central government. As a
result, we conclude that by 1984 and 1985, the central government
had more confidence in introducing changes in central-Shanghai
economic relationship.
CHAPTER THREE: INTEREST ARTICULATION IN SHANGHAI: AN OVERVIEW
In last chapter, we have seen that the central government had
been bound in its hands in allowing Shanghai to enjoy more
financial autonomy and the alleviating of its output value and
profit burdens, even though it began to recognize the
irrationality of the old development strategy and the potential
benefit of making a fundamental change in central-Shanghai
economic relationship. It is under this context that the emergence
and the impact of local interest articulation should be seen. It
suggests the system-dominant character of the Chinese political
system, and also the dependent nature of local interest
articulation activity. 1
(1) The Concept of Interest Articulation
To begin with, the concept of interest articulation should
examined more closely to disengage it from what it is used in
political contexts markedly different from communist politics.
Almond and Powell simply call interest articulation the process
of demand making. More specifically, the concept of interest
articulation has two shades of meaning: one horizontal and the
other vertical. The latter dimensionrefers to the assertion of
claim by individual or group advocates to those who make the
decisions within a polity,... [with] an attempt to influence the
authoritative policy process at the agenda-setting, decision-
making, or policy implementation stages. Horizontally,
interest articulation can be seen as a process of communication
among a category of people which has the result of enhancing the
level of consciousness of this group of people. A political
articulation may be regarded as an act of communication in which
an expression about the authoritative allocation of a value or set
of values is conveyed by one political participant to another,
writes Franklin Griffiths. 4 In this way, interest or value
articulation is not only a process to influence government policy-
making and policy implementation, but also the very process a
political group comes gradually into shape. 5
We should be aware that this concept is defined in a quite
high level of abstraction, meaning that it has been deprived of
many of the substances associated with the concept of interest
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articulation as used in Western democracies. This is exactly my
intention: to disengage this concept from many of the specific
characters attached to it in more liberal and pluralist contexts.
Therefore, when we speak of interest articulation in Shanghai,
neither do we mean that it carries the features of interest
articulation activities in Western democracies, nor it implies
subsystem autonomy. Since particular and sectoral interests are
bound to exist in all societies (although their manifestations
might be markedly different as a result of different systemic
constraints) and in one way or other they try to shape public
policies to their advantage, it is very useful to take interest
articulation as a generic concept and to think there are many
types of interest articulation that can be compared with one
another. What at issue then is not whether there exists interest
articulation in Chinese politics, but how it differs from that in
other political regimes and why. It is in this way that concepts
originally developed for analysing political phenomenon in Western
societies can be extended to enrich analysis of Chinese politics.
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As a matter of fact, the concept of interest articulation is
developed in the analytical framework of Gabriel Almond for
broader comparative purpose.
Many kinds of action can be regarded as interest articulation
according to our definition. They range from direct or indirect
expression of ideas to systematic formulation of alternatives, to
negotiating with and lobbying to the decision-makers and to
pretesting and demonstrating to in the street. Even terrorist
activities can be considered instances of interest articulation.
The forms in which interests are articulated may differ greatly
from one type of political system to another, along such
dimensions as the degree of openness, the level of organization
and coordination, the impact of interest articulation on
authoritative allocation of values etc. Moreover, although many
forms can be more or less found in all political systems, some of
them are more common in one type of polity than the others.
Therefore, in studying interest articulation in Chinese
politics, we should give close attention to the constraints
imposed by the strong emphasis on organizational unity and the
almost total absorption of society by the party-state. Some
common forms of interest articulation in pluralist society are
very unlikely to appear in China. Some of the forms of interest
articulation that are carried out openly in the West are conducted
behind the door and remains inaccessible to research. As far as
opencommunication of expectations and policy demands is concerned,
some features which have great bearing on research should be noted
also. The expression and articulation of interests are required to
follow certain rules: they are required to be presented in a way
to avoid being charged as advocating localism and as establishing
mountain stronghold. As Biddulph has said of regional interest
articulation in the CPSU Congresses on Soviet Union, the Soviet
political culture requires that 'acceptable' requests for goods
and services be communicated in a style that avoids open
partisanship, confrontation, or dramatization of demands.
Furthermore, even the most particular territorial issue must be
framed rhetorically in terms of broad national interests or tasks
to avoid the despicable label of 'localism'. What is good for
Yakutsk must be justified as essential for the Union. 13 This
also appears to be case in China. This special character of
interest articulation creates more difficulty for studying
interest articulation in China- a meticulous effort is needed to
identify the instances of articulation of local interest from the
discussion on national issues.
In the following discussion, we try to examine what has
shaped local interest articulation in Shanghai and its major
features.
(2) The Structural Basis of Interest Articulation in Shanghai
Let us begin with the underlying premise: economic relations
between different levels of government do not merely have economic
implication (for example, the ability of the central government to
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plan), and should not be left exclusively to the economists.
Many interesting political questions arise from the kinds of
economic relation between the centre and the province. One such
questions is: how did increasing economic decentralization to the
provincial level in China since the late 1950s affect the spatial
distribution of political power? Had the political power of the
central government been radically weakened as a result? Another
interesting question is: does the economic strength (or weakness)
of a province necessarily corresponds to its political strength
(or weakness) vis-a-vis the centre? This question is especially
relevant to Shanghai because it forces us to consider whether its
economic strength and the large amount of revenue it sends to the
central government annually has enhanced its political influence.
This question is more intriguing because there were many apparent
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evidences for an affirmative answer. These questions suggest
that economic issue is relevant to political analysis.
The emergence of interest articulation activities in Shanghai
in the early 1980s had also in part been shaped by the very
disadvantageous central-Shanghai economic relations. Moreover,
they had probably been shaped by the relatively liberal political
atmosphere and the gradual ascendency of the legitimacy of
particularistic and sectoral interests since 1978. The second
point is simply taken for granted here and our focus in this
section is to explain how interest articulation in Shanghai has
been shaped by its economic relations with the central government.
Shanghai's economic position in China can best be
characterized as asymmetrical, which means that what Shanghai had
gained did not commensurate (or more importantly, was perceived to
be not commensurate) to its significant contribution to the
national economy. As can be seen from the indicators presented in
last chapter, Shanghai had made very distinctive contribution to
the national economy. In particular, Tables 2.3a and 2.3b fully
demonstrate the extent of central government's reliance on the
revenue from Shanghai. Although the figures in Table 2.3b may
exaggerate the case due to mistake in method of calculation,
Shanghai's contribution is still unmistakable. In order not to
overstate Shanghai's contribution, it is also necessary to note
that part of the revenue recorded as Shanghai's revenue is in fact
the transfer of revenue of other regions resulting from the policy
of low prices for raw material and high price for consumer goods.
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Nevertheless, even the effect of this factor is deduced,
Shanghai's superior economic efficiency cannot be denied.
In sharp contrast to Shanghai's distinctive contribution,
Shanghai has received very little in return. From 1950 to 1979, it
was reported that 86.4% of Shanghai's revenue was transferred to
17
the central government. The situation did not change any at all
in the early 1980s. In this period, Shanghai was allowed to keep
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only about 10% of the revenue produced locally. This percentage
is particularly low compared not only to the average retention
rate of all provincial level units, but also to the other two
directly-ruled cities. In the early 1980s, Beijing and Tientsin
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were allowed to keep about 30% of their revenue.
However, this does not mean that all the revenue drained from
the municipal was invested in other localities. Shanghai did
receive some investment from the central government, but the
amount was probably quite small in the period between 1950 and
1979. The capital investments designated by the state in Shanghai
(which means central government) was said to be only a mere 7.8%
of the total revenue remitted by this city during this period.
The situation changed a great deal in the post-Mao era. Although
the percentage of revenue retained by the municipal government
remained basically unchanged (or even less), the investment of the
central government in Shanghai has increased greatly. Many
indicators can illustrate this trend. For one thing, the growth
rates of both capital investment as well as renovation and
transformation investment in Shanghai had risen sharply since the
late 1970s (see Table 2.7). This means that the central
government had returned a portion of the revenue it drained out of
Shanghai. Another indicator is that the shares of Shanghai's
Gross National Income invested in other localities has declined.
With the exception of the late 1970s and the early 1980s, it
is true to say that Shanghai's industry had received very little
investment. However, this does not tell us the whole reason why
the central government's policy toward Shanghai has prepared the
ground for local interest articulation. Not only had Shanghai
received very limited investment before the late 1970s, most of
the investment had been put in increasing the city's productive
capacity. This is obviously part and parcel of the central
government's attempt to turn Shanghai from a consumption city to a
productive city. It is also an integral part of the policy of
discriminating against the development of large city.
Before the late 1970s, municipal construction and other areas
relating to the livelihood of the people had laigely been put
aside. It was reported that during the first half of the 1970s
there was simply no housing construction in Shanghai. 26 The
investment in nonproductive areas accounted for a very small
proportion of the total investment in Shanghai and as presented in
Table 3.1, until 1976 its share was declining. In this table,
investment in municipal service and public utilities was
calculated as a sort of non-productive investment.
Many problems flow from the small amount of investment in
general and the meagre investment in non-production areas in
particular. Firstly, as capital construction was given first
priority in the investment policy, little had been left for
renovating the old enterprises. Many of the old enterprises,
especially those in the light and textile industrial sectors, were
largely equipped with machines of 1940s and 1950s. Factories were
said to be operating under extremely congested conditions. The
municipal services were said to be lagging far behind the demands
of the population and the requirements of the burgeoning economic
activities. It was generally agreed that the problem of housing
shortage in Shanghai was desperate. Although the official data
suggests that the average per capita housing area in Shanghai was
not significantly lower than that of other cities in China,
figures in more specific terms suggest the otherwise. For example,
although it was said that per capita average housing area was 4.3
square meters, the author pointed out at the same time that the
households having less than 4 square meter per capita housing area
(918,000) composed of about 60% of the total households in the
city. The same author said in another article that, according to a
survey in 1978, the households with less than 2 square meter per
capita housing areas made up a fourth of the total households in
Shanghai. As a result of the unlimited development of
industrial enterprises in the core city proper and the emphasis on
developing heavy industry, the problem of pollution and congestion
were said to have come to a critical stage. 30
The asymmetry of Shanghai's position is also reflected in the
fact that although the per capita productivity of Shanghai's
industrial workers was substantially higher than the national
average level, their wage was only a bit higher than the national
average, and was lower than that of some cities and provinces. 31
From 1957 to 1983, it was said that the increase rates of
Shanghai's household income (3.0%) had been slower than the
national average (6.8%).
The foregoing analysis suggests that contribution and the
distribution of Shanghai was extremely asymmetrical. However, it
should also be remarked that they are objective indicators only;
they themselves do not necessarily identical to the perception of
the elites and the citizens of Shanghai. For the present
discussion, it would be ideal if we have information on how the
central-Shanghai economic relations were thought in Shanghai.
Unfortunately, However, this dimension remains unresearcheable in
the current state of research. Therefore, the above analysis only
fulfils part of the requirements for establishing our thesis. When
we say that the highly extractionist policy of the central
government had provided a basis for interest articulation in the
early 1980s, there is an analytical leap.
On the other hand, while we cannot offer a systematic account
of the perception in Shanghai, it seems apparent that a sense of
unfairness was widely felt in Shanghai. Such impression can be
gained from reading the responses to Shen Chunbor's article in
Jiefang Ribao_ in October 1980 and through several discussion with
visitors from Shanghai and other regions. Once when I talked to a
scholar from Beijing about central-Shanghai economic relationship,
his first remark was that Shanghai's people was very angry about
that.
The interest articulation in the early 1980s in Shanghai was
obviously shaped by other two contextual factors. First, as the
analysis of the preceding chapter implies, it was facilitated by
the ambivalent attitude of the central government on this issue.
Second, the more liberal political climate since 1978 helps to
turn this potential into a reality. In this sense, local interest
articulation is a product of the reforms in the post-Mao era.
(3) The Participants in Interest Articulation: Searching For an
Analytical Focus
Students of Chinese politics working on central-provincial
relationship have focused their attention mainly on the tension in
the roles to be played by the provincial leadership. The
provincial leaders, particularly the provincial first party
secretaries, are regarded as political middlemen or prefects
because they are under cross pressure, from the central government
on the one hand and from their localities on the other. It is
frequently argued that the somewhat conflict requirements imbedded
in such roles furnish the very stuff for central-provincial
dynamics in Chinese politics. There are some excellent researches
along this line.
Therefore, Goodman considers the concepts of province and
provincial interests vague and circular. He then advocates that
it is the leading cadres in the formal political system at these
levels alone who can be seen to articulate interests. 34 In his
analysis, Goodman concentrates on the ideas and behaviour of the
most important provincial figures such as Li JIngquan in Sichuan
and Zhou Lin in Guizhou.
However, such a focus is too narrow to study interest
articulation in the early 1980s in Shanghai and it is perhaps too
narrow for studying central-local relationship in Chinese politics
in general as well. First, by definition the political middleman
is partially an agent of the central government in a locality.
Secondly, as the political middlemen are appointed by the central
government and depend on the latter for the future of their
political careers, they cannot help but closely follow the central
government's directives and not to press too much for the sectoral
interests. The third reason is more practical in nature but it
raises more question about the strategy of looking exclusively on
the provincial leaders for local interest articulation. Because of
the importance of the political middlemen or prefects in the
political system and because of Chinese communist party's strong
hostility to departmentalism, dispersalism and localism, even when
the leading provincial leaders do hold strong sectoral
orientation, they are unlikely to express it publicly. As Teiwes
observed, on the whole, statements of provincial leaders
contained strikingly little overt articulation of provincial
interests, and that which did occur was largely veiled and
indirect, the public posture of provincial leaders placed more
emphasis on their role as an arm of the central authorities than
on their position as the representatives of provincial interests
However, the lack of evidences of local interest articulation
in the statement of provincial leaders by no means always suggests
that local interest articulation does not exist.
These considerations are particularly relevant to Shanghai.
Let us first discuss the practical barrier of research. Although
the formal power holders at the provincial level are quite
tangible and they are widely covered in the press, these
activities are not clues to their positions as well as their
behaviours with regard to central-local relations. Even these
provincial leaders do press for local interests, it is rarely made
public. Surveying the open speeches made by the municipal leaders
during this period, we find that there were very few requests
and demands for more consideration of Shanghai's interests. While
this does not necessarily mean that these municipal leaders did
not articulate for municipal interests, it does suggest that they
did not make it publicly. Moreover, local interests are more
likely to be expressed and articulated by people holding less
formal positions and in less formal arenas, if only because they
will be more tolerated by the central government. These
characteristics leave us with no choice but to study those more
tangible activities. Of course, as said before, the open character
of these interest articulation activities make them particularly
interesting phenomenon for political analysis.
However, a stronger case can be made from the theoretical
front. It seems apparent that as a result of Shanghai's singular
importance to China, it was more tightly controlled by the central
government. The top municipal leadership is more likely to be the
representatives of the central government than the leadership in
other provincial level units. Of course, this is only a hypothesis
and we do not have any conclusive evidences to argue for its
validity. Some indirect evidences, however, suggest that this
seems to be the case. All first municipal party Secretaries and
Mayors from 1980 to 1985 and after 1985 in Shanghai have strong
central background before their Shanghai appointment. Chen Guodong
was the Minister of Food and a member of the Finance and Economic
Committee of the State Council in 1979 while Wang Daohan was then
vice minister in the Ministry of Economic relations with Foreign
Countries. Jiang Zemin was deputy directors of Import and Export
Investment Management Committee and the Foreign Investment
Management Committee from 1981. From 1983 to 1985, he was Minister
of Electronics Industry. Before becoming Minister of Urban and
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Rural Construction and Environmental Protection in 1984, Rui
Xingwen was vice Minister of the Space Industry.
The appointments of some of these municipal leaders after
leaving Shanghai are also indicative. Chen Jinhua, formerly deputy
Mayor of Shanghai and Director of municipal Planning Commission,
was appointed the President of China National Petrochemical
Corporation, a giant conglomerate set up by the State Council in
1983. 39 Wang Daohan became the Director of the Planning Office of
Shanghai Economic Zone under the State Council after stepping down
from the Mayorship of Shanghai. Jiang Zemin and Rui Xingwen, Major
and Fiist Party Secretary since 1985, were appointed member of the
Politbuio and the Central Secretariat respectively in the Seventh
Party Congiess in 198. Here we propose a different line of
analysis of the elevation of these two Shanghai leaders to the
central level from those positing that these appointments once
again revealed Shanghai's importance and its influence In the
national politics. We maintain that because they served as major
and party secretary of Shanghai for only a relatively short period
of time and during this period they had not made miracle in
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Shanghai, their elevation up to the power hierarchy in 1987
indicates that they were the men that had already earned the
confidence of the central leaders before coming to Shanghai in
1985. Their appointments to the powerful central organs indicated
their personal political clout rather than that of Shanghai. In
fact, it can be hypothesized that because Shanghai was a critical
stage in 1985, they were handpicked to put the Shanghai economy
back to the right track. These evidences in one way or other all
point to the possibility that as a result of Shanghai's strategic
importance, the central government has imposed greater degree of
control through appointing men with more central orientation to
Shanghai. Therefore, these men are more likely to be central men
than speakers for Shanghai's interests.
We do not have detailed background information on other
municipal leaders before 1983. However, the background of other
municipal leaders (deputy mayors and member of the municipal party
Committee) from MarchApril 1983 contrasted sharply with the
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background of those leaders just discussed. Many standing
committee members of the municipal party committee since the 198v
reshuffle had Shanghai background. Similarly, the vice Mayorj
appointed in april 1983 also had their career in Shanghai before
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becoming vice mayors. This disparity in background might provide
a basis in the dividing the municipal leadership. Again, this i;
an empirical question. We do not have adequate information to test
whether this hunch is true and this should remain a point foi
further to be tested by further research. However, it is
interesting to note that Chu Zhongbao tended to have different
opinion of the cause for Shanghai's poor economic performance ir
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1983 from that of Chen Guodong.
A province can be conceived as an area defined by the
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circulation of men, goods and ideas over time. Above all, most
of the existing provinces in China have been long in existence.
Furthermore, not only does a province has its own political
tradition, it also potentially serves as an institutional basis
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upon which common interests can be developed. Moreover, as
suggested in the preceding section, central government's policy
sometimes also unintendedly helps the development of a common
consciousness in an area. Again, these are also particularly true
to Shanghai. For example, Shanghai has been conceived to be
foreign to the real China or simply as the other China. Faced
with a peasant, national and military revolution, a scholar
commented, Shanghai embodied another tradition: working class,
intellectual, and internationalistic. And this tradition was
thought to be as real as that of the countryside and as
47
authentic as the rural China. While it is very difficult to
demonstrate and assess the effect of this distinctive tradition,
some specialists did state that there existed some tensions
between the communist party and Shanghai. It remains for the
communist administration of city after 1949, Murphey said, to
substitute their familiar order of austerity and morality for the
laxity and easy virtue which some Shanghai residents thought would
prove a match even for the People's Government. 48 The
distinctive tradition which distinguish Shanghai from the rest of
China, would probably help maintain the cohesion of the municipal
although this should remain a speculation.
For the reasons suggested above, in this study of local
interest articulation in Shanghai, we focus not on the formal
municipal leaders, but on the ideas and behaviours of people in
lesser important and formal capacity. It will be assumed that
under a handful of centrally designated leaders, there are a great
number of cadres who are likely to be more identified and
concerned with Shanghai's interest and its roles in China. The
masses in Shanghai were also more concerned with Shanghai's
financial situation because upon this the improvement of their
livelihood was depended. It was reported in 1981 that there were
some sense of resistance among the cadres and the workers in
Shanghai to the continuing emphasis on raising production, and the
municipal government found it necessary to carry out a propaganda
educationon economic situation to sooth the people of Shanghai.
In a conference to call for tapping unused potential and
increasing production and revenue in 1981, Wang Daohan stated that
it was necessary to boost the morale of the cadres and the
workers. He further said that whether the tasks of increasing
production and revenue could be achieved depended on the state of
the mind of the cadres. 88 It is this group of people who are seen
as articulating for municipal interest in this analysis. HOwever,
this does not mean that the newly elected vice mayors from
Shanghai can be shown as articulating for local interests. The
practical barrier for research discussed above still holds for
them. However, the words and deeds of some lesser prominent
figures are more tangible.
The most outspoken speakers on the municipal interests in
Shanghai during the early 1980s were the intellectuals affiliated
with some research institutes in Shanghai. Such institutions as
Shanghai Economic Research Centre and the Institute of Sectoral
Economics of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences had been heavily
involved. However, they are not pure intellectuals. True, there
were no evidences that the major municipal leaders (especially the
Mayor and the First Party Secretary) were directly involved in
interest articulation, and they were unlikely to be involved for
the reasons already discussed before, these activities had
nevertheless in many ways linked to the municipal government. In
point of fact, many activities had involved the Planning
Commission and the Economic Commission of the municipal
government.
Furthermore, Shanghai Economic Research Centre is also part
of the municipal establishment. Established in December 1980, it
is described as the general economic advisory and research
institute of the municipal party committee and government. It has
the responsibility of organizing research according to the
economic policy-making needs of the municipal government and party
committee, and to submit proposals for decision-making. The
leading cadres of this centre were Dong Jiabang, Ma Yihang, Chou
Ke, Chai Beihua, Wang Meizheng, Wang Darning, He Gaosheng and Gu
Shuzhen. Some of them can be identified to have held important
positions in the municipal government. For example, Ma Yihang was
the director of the Municipal Planning Commission in 1982. 52 Wang
Meizheng was formerly the head of the municipal Bureau of Finance.
Chai Beihua was identified as deputy Secretary General of the
Standing Committee of the Municipal People's Congress and deputy
Director of its Finance and Economic Committee. Gu shuzhen was
formerly identified as the Head of the municipal Bureau of Finance
and later as deputy Secretary General to the municipal government.
He Gaosheng was later referred as the Director of the municipal
Economic Commission. Although these people did not speak out
openly to articulate the municipal interest, they should be seen
as heavily involved because the institution under their management
had played a key role in interest articulation in Shanghai in the
early 1980s.
The following general remark of Franklin Griffiths on how
power is likely to be distributed in Soviet politics is perhaps
also applicable to our search for the relevant actors in Chinese
politics and to our attempt to study how power is exercised in
China. In political analysis, and especially in the study of
Soviet politics, Griffith said, there is a preference for the
consideration of power and its exercise by those in authority. It
is appreciated but not greatly taken into account that the
political decision-maker is generally constrained by the situation
in which he find himself. Not only may he be required to secure
the compliance of peers and less participants, but he is often
called to upon to resolve technical problems that try the best of
minds.... [The decision-maker's response to a policy situation]
are defined for him by the communicated expectation of other
actors.... We may regard his behaviour as being subject to
special forms of influence as a result of the articulations of
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intermediate actors. This line of analysis has been strongly
emphasized by scholars in the fields of administration and
organization. Crozier's excellent analysis of the relationship
between power and uncertainty in organization indicates very well
that as long as uncertainty cannot be completely eliminated,
power that does not observe the formal stipulation is bound to
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develop within the organization. Among others, the areas that
require expertise are most uncertain and therefore most likely
give rise to power. The views and the analysis of the less formal
elites are more important in certain issues than their positions
are likely to suggest. The articulation of interest by these
actors should be seen as more than peripheral in central-local
politics.
(4) A Tendency of Articulations, not Group Politics
As many scholars have noted, the interest group concept does
not fit the reality of communist politics. While there are all
kinds of categoric groups (workers, peasants, cadres, writers,
intellectuals, army, to name only a few) in communist societies,
it is very problematic to take these categoric groups as the
analytical focus and to see them as articulating for their groups
interests. For one thing, as a result of the unlimited extension
of the party-state and the strong emphasis on organizational
unity, politics of the communist parties is the politics of
organization and not of autonomous groups... which gives politics
a special quality, as Andrew Janos suggested aptly. Moreover,
as suggested by Griffiths, on the one hand these categoric groups
are unlikely to display adequate degree of interaction to become
groups in politics; on the other, even group interaction does
exist, because of the absence of data we have no way in
demonstrating its presence and influence. 60 Therefore, although
there are evidences of interest articulation in communist
politics, it cannot be properly described as instances of interest
groups activities.
Turning to this case of interest articulation in Shanghai, it
can also be shown that there are limitation for making a case for
interest groups. First of all, can Shanghai be considered a group?
At the superficial level, yes. It is of course constituted by a
category of people. In the preceding section, we have suggested
thatan administrative region is an area defined by the circulation
of men, goods and ideas over time. Being a municipal, Shanghai has
expectedly had more intense circulation in these regards.
Moreover, Shanghai's distinctive historical tradition and its
special economic position might also give it more identity. It has
been widely acknowledged that there is a great Shanghai-ism (da
Shanghai chuyi) in Shanghai, implying that some common
consciousness does exist to a certain extent in Shanghai.
However, it remains to be determined whether these are
adequate reasons to make Shanghai a group in politics. The
obstacles for group formation and the research on group activity
as discussed by Griffiths and others are very real for considering
Shanghai a group in politics. Considering the large population of
this area, the organizational complexity of the municipal and the
severe constraints on group formation, it would probably be
more useful to take Shanghai as internally fragmented. Rather than
assuming the existence of interaction group, it is more fruitful
to see the internal cohesion of the group as situationally defined
and tend to vary with policy issues. Therefore, instead of
beginning from the concept of interest group, our primary focus
is on the acts of articulation. We only try to demonstrate there
have been some evidences of local interest articulations in
Shanghai over its economic relationship to the central government.
As the discussion in next Chapter will makes it clear, in keeping
with David Truman's concern for the necessity of interaction,
group formation will be seen as a product of these acts of
interest articulations, not vice versa.
This takes us to Franklin Griffiths' concept of tendency of
articulation. Tendency of articulation, Griffiths said, is a mass
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of common articulations which persist over time. This concept
just describes the patterns (i.e. the existence of uniformities)
of articulation, without attributing too much coordination, which
in reality might not have, to them. Another notable merit of this
concept is that it allows for variations in different policy
areas. For example, a tendency of articulation may exist in one
policy area, but not in other. This is particularly important for
analysing central-local politics in China because local interest
articulation tends to vary witli policies. It tends to be affected
by different policy situations and the issues at stake. It can be
inferred very clear from the discussion in section 2 of this
chapter that interest articulation in Shanghai examined here seems
to be quite policy specific. Whether the same can be observed in
other policy areas is in fact open to doubt.
It should be noted that the main objective of describing
interest articulation in Shanghai as a tendency is to underscore
the dubious nature of interest articulation in Chinese politics.
It is helpful in stating what it is not, but not very much so in
saying what it is. Many questions of interest articulation are
left unanswered. Moreover, we do not follow Griffiths closely, as
his main purpose is to offer a framework for analysing the Soviet
policy-making process: the policy-making process in seen as a
process of conflict between different tendencies. In this case
study, we only borrow his concept of tendency of articulation to
underscore the nature of interest articulation in Shanghai,
largely by stating what it is not.
CHAPTER FOUR
ARENAS AND ISSUES IN INTEREST ARTICULATION
In Chapter Three, we have sketched some major features and
characters of interest articulation in Shanghai. The present
chapter continues this task by examining where the municipal
interest had been articulated and what had been articulated. These
are important dimensions of interest articulation and it is along
this and other dimensions that interest articulation activities
vary with different political systems. An examination of these
dimensions thus helps us to understand more about the nature of
interest articulation and how it influences policy development in
China.
(1) Arenas and Instances of Interest Articulation in Shanghai
In discussing the arenas and instances of interest
articulations in Shanghai, we should first of all note that as a
result of our narrow focus on the less formal actors, many
possible arenas for interest articulation will not be examined.
Therefore, we are only concerned with the lesser formal arenas of
interest articulation. As suggested in last Chapter, this also
means that our analysis of interest articulation in Shanghai is
confined to a few types of activity, which is by no means
exhaustive. Apart from the activities and sites discussed here, it
is possible that Shanghai's interests had been articulated during
the visits of the central leaders to Shanghai, or on such
occasions as Central Work Conferences of various types which the
municipal leaders had attended.
Interest articulation in Shanghai during the early 1980s
appeared in different arenas, the most important of which was
probably the seminars organized by the economic associations in
Shanghai to discuss Shanghai's economic problems. As early as
1979, the economic associations in Shanghai organized a biweekly
seminar, which as reported, was attended by not only by academics
but also municipal officials. The topics covered in this
2
seminar are wide-ranging, but the dominant theme of this bi¬
weekly seminar is What kind of Shanghai is to be Built. In light
of what had been the topics for discussion in these seminars and
what had been published as a result, it is quite obvious that they
had become important arenas for the local elites to formulate
their positions and propositions on Shanghai's economic strategy
and to press for a thorough reconsideration of central-Shanghai
relations. These seminars should be seen as articulating for local
interest because they not only represents the assertion of
interests vertically to the central government, but also represent
acts of communication in which an expression about the
authoritative allocation of a value or set of values is conveyed
3
by one participant to another. In the latter sense, these
seminars provide semi-institutionalized channels for interests
communication and for the development of group identity, which
according to David Truman, are necessary for turning a categoric
group (whose members share similar opinion and are placed in
4
similar objective situation) to a group of interaction. It was
reported that from July 1979 to early 1980, about 60 such seminars
had been convened to discuss Shanghai's economic problems.
These seminars were originally co-organized by Shanghai's
Academy of Social Sciences and the Municipal Planning Commission.
Later, the sponsoring organizations increased to eight, including
the Municipal Economic Commission, Shanghai Economic Research
Centre, the Finance and Economic Commissions of the Municipal
People s Congress and the Municipal Political Consultative
Conference. As a result, these seminars were able to draw many
types of local elites to discuss the difficulties encountered by
Shanghai's economy. Moreover, economic organizations in Shanghai
were loosely coordinated. It was mentioned in 1983 that the
Secretary-Generals of Shanghai's economic and academic
associations met on December 30, 1982 to determine the focuses and
the agendas of research. It appears that such meeting was held
regularly. In addition, it should be noted that there are some
institutional bases for the articulation of interests. The
Institute of Sectoral Economy of Shanghai Academy of Social
Sciences was obviously such an example. Throughout the early
1980s, the research staff of this institute had consistently
argued for a fundamental changes of Shanghai's development
strategy, and they had been seen as engaging in a number of
collective efforts. For example, a group was formed in the
Institute to undertake a comprehensive and in-depth inquiry into
Shanghai's economic development strategy. As to be discussed
below, this group had been very influential in shaping later
development largely because of its research and proposals. Another
indicator of this close interaction is the formation of Shanghai
Economic Research Centre in 1980. It served as coordinating agent
and appeared to have been entrusted with the responsibility to
monitor and organize economic researches in Shanghai. For example,
from 1982 onward nearly all important meetings on economic
pioblems in Shanghai were said to be chiefly organized by this
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Centre. The centre's office also published a journal Research
Shanghai s Economy to communicate research and policy
recommendations. In this light, Shanghai Economic Research Centre
can be seen as providing another institutional basis facilitating
the development of common interests.
These seminars must be seen as an important arena for local
interest articulation, because they not only provided
opportunities for the local elites to exchange and form their
views on Shanghai economic problems, and for them to formulate
their interests, these ideas and demands were capable of reaching
the policy-makers both in the municipal and the central levels as
well. This is because on the one hand these seminars were co-
organized by such important institutions as the municipal Economic
and Planning Commissions, and on the other hand were attended by
top municipal leaders. Chen Jianhua and Wang Daohan, Deputy Mayor
and Mayor respectively, were quoted to have once participated in
these seminars in 1980 and 1982. Yu Guangyuan was also quoted to
Q
have spoken in the seminar in early 1982. The seminars in
early 1982 were organized mainly for the purpose of drafting
Shanghai's Sixth Five-year-plan and preparing its Seventh Five-
year-plan. As a result, they were formally given a role in policy¬
making.
However, these seminars had been far more important in terms
of local interest articulation than merely being an occasion for
the local elites to meet and to discuss Shanghai's economic
problems. They provides the stuff for more open articulation of
interest. The seminars were reported to have involved a large
number of local elites, but we must say that they are capable of
reaching a small proportion of people only. The nature and the
impact of the ideas and interests expressed in the seminars would
be completely different if they were communicated to larger number
of people. The same substance would have different political
impact if it is presented differently. This had been the case in
Shanghai in 1979 and 1980. In the following paragraphs, we turn to
examine other instances of local interest articulation.
One of the places that instances of local interest
articulation can be found is the Social Sciences (Shehui Kexue)
journal published by the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. From
mid-1979 (it is perhaps interesting to note that the first meeting
of Seminar on Shanghai's Economic Problems was convened in July
1979) to 1980, this journal organized two special topics. One was
The Present State and the Problems of Shanghai's Economy and the
other was What Kind of Shanghai Is to Be Built. 9 Nearly a
hundred pieces of articles, researches and policy proposals had
been published under these two special topics. The articles under
the first topic were published in the fourth, fifth and sixth
issues of 1979 and the first two issues of 1980, while the
articles under the second topic appeared in the last four issues
of 1980. Although the headings would suggest that the first set
of articles was concerned with objective analysis of the situation
of Shanghai's economy and the second was concerned with policy
proposals, there was no such clear division of labour. Ihe
headings are misnomers. The first set of articles had as much
policy recommendation as the second one. Although some articles
were presented in the form of objective inquiry, most of them was
conspicuous by their normative tone. One cannot help feeling that
the authors were more interested in advancing some policy
proposals and interests than doing objective analysis. A majority
of the authors of these publications were the members of the
Institute of Sectoral Economy of Shanghai Academy of Social
Sciences, but people from other institutions were also involved.
The publication of these articles, researches and policy
recommendations in Social Sciences should be seen more as an
attempt to influence policy-making than as one to further
scholarly understanding of academic problems. If it can said that
expression of particularistic interests and policy proposals in
academic journal is common in China, the systematic presentation
of this kind of ideas is a less common phenomenon. Such phenomenon
can be conceived as a collective attempt in interest articulation.
The summation of the parts is not equal to the sum; its political
significance far exceeds the sum of the individualistic attempts
in interest articulation.
Apart from those articles published under these two special
topics, Social Sciences also published a number of articles after
this series of discussion had been formally closed, but they were
published in a less systematic manner. Compared with other
channels, Social sciences was noted for its persistency in
publishing ideas and proposals relating to the strategy of
Shanghai's economic development. Nearly every issue contains some
articles on Shanghai's economic situation, and some of them carry
very strong normative tone. The importance of this journal as ar
arena for local interest articulation was that as an major
academic journal in Shanghai and in China as well, the ideas anc
suggestion proposed there were able to reach a much larger number
of people. In a sense, it was also conducive to communication anc
circulation of ideas within a circle of people in Shanghai anc
hence was conducive to the development of common interests on the
question of central-Shanghai economic relations.
The ideas expressed in the Seminars on Shanghai's Economic
Problems were also published in local newspapers. As the local
newspapers are more official in nature and can reach a far great
number of people, such phenomenon should of course be more
interesting to political analysis. Jiefang Ribao, the official
newspaper of the municipal Party Committee, published a summary of
the ideas expressed in the Seminars on Shanghai's Economic
Problems only in August 1980. It should be noted that this was
later than RMRB had published a analysis of Shanghai's economic
problems by a State Council research group in April this year. It
is also interesting to note that the discussion in the seminars
was presented in the form of a summary which outlined different
viewpoints on many significant problems of economic development
strategy. It was presented in this way probably to avoid arousing
hostility from the central government. However, such ambivalence
gave way to more explicit and outspoken expression in October,
when Jiefang Ribao published an article by Shen Junbor which took
over a half of its first page. This article was presented in a
dramatic way (Shanghai had ten number Is and five number Is from
the bottom up) that easily captured the attention of the readers.
10 The main idea was that Shanghai had been badly treated, and
what it had been given compared meagerly with its contribution.
This message had been excitingly echoed in the subsequent days. In
its front pages, Jiefang Ribao arranged a column (What is meant by
Ten No. Is and five no. Is from the bottom up?) for the responses
to Shen Junbor's article. The ideas expressed in this column,
which lasted for about a month, unambiguously suggested the
impression that the cadres as well as the people of Shanghai had
very feeling about central government's extractionist policy to
Shanghai.
The appearance of Shen Junbor's outspoken words in the front
page of the municipal party newspaper should not be taken merely
as the expression of an individual's point of view. (Shen was a
member of the Institute of Sectoral Economy and had played a
pioneering role in demanding for a change in central-Shanghai
relations. He was later identified as Director of the Centre for
Economic, Legal and Social Consultation under the Shanghai Academy
of Social Sciences. 11) The act of giving such ideas a prominent
place in the party newspaper at least could not happen without a
large degree of support from the municipal leadership. Again, the
distinction between unofficial and official cannot be tidily made.
However, it remains an interesting political phenomenon that the
formal-office holders had never spoken anything to such effect
openly although they were believed to had had a hand in these
interest articulations.
Such expression of ideas is a political phenomenon of grea
importance. Firstly, the expression of localist concerns and loca
interest articulation has become more open and direct, rather than
close and indirect as in the past. And secondly and as a result of
the first, the message was able to reach a wide spectrum of people
in Shanghai and in fact this had the consequence of arousing their
discontent. Again, this is our horizontal sense of interest
articulation and it helps to create and nurture a common objective
in Shanghai.
However, the articulation of local interest in such a
prominent place was an exception rather than a rule in shanghai.
This is the only instance that the local interests were expressed
in such manner. In other cases, similar demands and interests were
expressed in less explicit and less direct way. For example, the
commentator of JFRB argued in 1979 that the balance between bone
and meat needed to be restored and Shanghai's industries needed
more investment to maintain and increase its productivity. In
an editorial calling for increasing production and saving on April
6, 1979, it was also addressed a host of issues related to the
mixture of investment and the problem of municipal construction
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and the people's livelihood in Shanghai. However, one can
question whether these should be seen as evidences for local
interest articulation. While they did address those problems in
Shanghai, they might very well only be the attempts of the
municipal government to appease the municipal citizens and they
might simply be statements of the main tasks of the municipal
government. Above all, they were not presented in such a manner to
demand for a change in central government's policy.
Jiefang Ribao also occasionally published some articles in
itsless prominent positions.For example, somearticles that carries
a strong tone of local interest articulation were published in its
fourth page which was formally devoted to academic discussion.
Typical examples of these include Wang Chukang's articles
demanding for lessening of Shanghai's financial and output value
pressure, Ni Yiping's article complaining the disperse use of
limited funds and raw materials in the bicycle industry, 15 Shen
Junbor and his associates' articles on the problems in economic
cooperation between Shanghai and other regions, and Shen's
article calling for putting more emphasis on fully developing
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Shanghai's role as a core city.
Other instances of local interest articulation were often
expressed in news reports, such as in reports about the slow
progress in exports, developing new products and in adopting new
technology. Frequently, these problems were attributed to
inadequate funds, exacting production pressure. It is not
difficult to draw from these reports the implicit demands that
Shanghai's industrial enterprises should be relieved of the tight
output value and profit target that placed on them.
However, as a party newspaper, Jiefang Ribao was severely
constrained in being an arena for local interest articulation.
While the voices of the local chauvinists had found way to this
powerful media, it should not be concluded that it had become an
instrument for local interest articulation. The nature of this
newspaper prevents it from becoming too involved in speaking out
for the local interests. From early 1981 onward, JFRB was
basically reticent in issues on central-Shanghai relations. On the
contrary, the sentiment that Shanghai's industrial capacity had
been fully utilized and it should be given a lighter load was
criticized frequently in 1981 and 1982 in Jiefang Ribao. 18
On the one hand, this frequent criticism points to the fact
that this sentiment was very strong and prevalent in Shanghai. For
example, a JFRB commentator's article on April 4, 1981 commented
that some comrades do not have an adequate understanding of the
state's demand upon Shanghai under the current situation of
financial difficulty. Therefore there exists some ambiguous ideas
which have inhibited the implementation of the principles of
readjustment and the fulfilment of the planned tasks. It further
stated that many people thought that the capacity of the light and
textile industries in Shanghai have been fully tapped that the
continuing demand on tapping latent potentialities and increasing
production amount to the practice in the past of unrealistically
19
aiming at high targets. Another commentator article in May
1982 also pointed to the same phenomenon. It was indicated that
when the bicycle industry in Shanghai was asked to reduce its cost
of production to the lowest level in history and when it was said
that its latent potentials had not been fully tapped, there
existed some grievances among the cadres and workers of the
bicycle industry. They attributed cause for the rise of the cost
of production to the raise in price of raw materials while the
20
commentator emphasized the subjective cause. This feeling was
obviously produced by the central government's insistence that
Shanghai should increase production and reduce expenditure in 1981
to help the central government solve the acute financial
„ 21
difficulty facing it at that moment.
On the other hand, this indicated that JFRB was inherently
handicapped in serving as an arena for advancing local interests.
Just as the municipal leadership which is required to show its
loyalty to the central government and also to be aware of the
interests of Shanghai at the same time, Jiefang Ribao cannot help
but demonstrate the same contradiction and ambiguity. In 1981 and
1982 when the central government was in great financial
difficulty, Shanghai was compelled to turn in more revenue
(especially by producing more durable consumer goods such as
watches, bicycles and sewing machines.) to reduce central
government's financial deficit. Jiefang Ribao hence became a tool
for this primary objective. As a result, the concerns that had
been expressed in 1979 and 1980 was suppressed and the emphasis
was shifted to the execution of the tasks assigned by the central
government to Shanghai during this critical moment. However, this
does not suggest that the concerns and interests expressed in the
previous years had disappeared. The issues that had contributed to
the emergence of these concerns and interests were still there and
with the passage of time had gradually become more serious. As
shown before, the fact that the party newspaper found it necessary
to stress the responsibility of Shanghai repeatedly and to correct
the wrong sentiment indicated that there indeed existed
widespread discontent and grievances in Shanghai. Just as Wang
Daohan and Chen Guodong (as well as other municipal leaders) were
not seen as actively articulating local interest does not mean
that there was not local interest articulation in Shanghai, the
reticence of Jiefang Ribao from 1981 onward on local interest
articulation (and ceasing to be an arena for local interest
articulation in Shanghai) does not mean that local interest
articulation does not exist during this period. They did not
appear in JFRB, but in elsewhere.
However, on September 9, 1984, Jiefang Ribao published in
its front page a report by NCNA reporters. This report emphasized
Shanghai's contribution to the whole country and the problems
facing Shanghai in recent years. If published at other moment,
this should be taken as evidence for local interest articulation,
but for the reasons below, this should be taken as no more than a
policy propaganda. By that moment, the central government had
already decided to undertake some radical measures to rejuvenate
22
Shanghai. Jiefang Ribao published an editorial very soon
saying that the Party centre and the State Council had committed
23
to the task of renovating Shanghai. Several days later, a
large scale conference on the Strategy and the Tactics of
Shanghai's Economic Development was convened, and participated by
about five hundred people from the central and from Shanghai. As
indicated by Wang Daohan, this large scale conference, while
formally organized by the Municipal government, was supervised by
the central government. Sung Ping, State Councillor and Director
24
of the State Planning Commission, attended the seminar. The
seminar should best be seen as an occasion to confirm and
publicize the policy that had been already determined than as an
occasion of policy deliberation. Many prominent economists spoke
in the conference, most of them urging for more decentralization
of power to Shanghai. However, if the ideas expressed by these
famous economists closely resembled those discussed before and
that these economists shared the concerns of the local elites,
these speeches should not be taken as instances of attempts to
influence policy. They spoke mainly to render more legitimacy to
the central government's commitment to renovate Shanghai. Again,
the same substance can mean different things in different
contexts.
Although the Seminars on Shanghai's Economic Problems
continued in 1981 and early 1982, Jiefang Ribao had basically been
silent in both this activity and its substance. However, it was
obvious from the reports elsewhere that the major concern of the
seminars was still with what kind of Shanghai is to be built. 26
The agenda of seminars in early 1982 was tied to the drafting of
Shanghai's Sixth Five-Year Plan, as indicated by Ma Yihang, then
27
the Director of the Municipal Planning Commission. In late
September, 1982, the seminar fixed its discussion on the question
of If the output value of the whole country is to be quadrupled,
28
what should be done by Shanghai. Although the details of the
conference was not revealed, the idea that Shanghai should aim at
quadrupling its output value appeared to have been questioned.
While in this conference it was indicated that it was possible for
Shanghai to quadruple its output value by the end of this century,
it was also demanded that Shanghai should aim at making greater
contribution to the modernization of China. And it was stressed in
the sub-heading that while the problem of what should be done by
Shanghai was a serious political task, but it was also a complex
economic problem requiring in-depth and detailed research, as well
as repeated verification based on the spirit of seeking truth. In
fact, that the problem of what should be done by Shanghai was
raised implicitly implied that the local community had reservation
in following the national norm in demanding a quadrupling of
output value. If this should be accepted readily, it would have
been superfluous to raise such a question. This was borne out by
the more explicit expression emerged later.
Obviously in response to the popularity of the idea of
quadrupling (fanliangfan), Chen Minzhi, formally affiliated to
the Institute of Sectoral Economy, argued in A Preliminary
Discussion on Shanghai's Economic Development Strategy in mid-
1983 that the answer for Shanghai long-term development goal
should not simply be quadrupling its output value because, he
said, it would be difficult to accept the objective and scientific
character of such figure which was not set in a scientific manner
and furthermore, it would be difficult for some contribution and
29
performance to be measured and realized quantitatively. This
was not consistent with the official line at that point of time.
30
It bears close resemblance to those concerns expressed
31
earlier, and what was to be expressed later.
Wang Daohan also stated in 1984 that beginning from 1982,
Shanghai had been discussing the problem of how to better bring
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into full play Shanghai's role. This indicates very well that
while Shanghai was on the one hand kept busying fulfilling the
immediate tasks imposed by the central government during 1981 and
1982, it was on the other hand in the process of formulating long
term development strategy. Therefore, it can be drawn that
although the party newspaper did not serve as an arena for local
interest articulations during this period, they were still alive
in Shanghai, and were geared to the process of determining
Shanghai s Sixth Five ear Plan. This Five-Year-Plan was passed in
the Eighth municipal People's Congress in late April 1983 and
published several days later. A new slogan Squeezing outward,
internal combination. transformation and development {Waiji,
Neilian. Gaizao and Faznan) was raised in Wang Daohan's government
work report in the same congress. In about the same time, the
State Council approved Shanghai's request for expanding its
autonomy in foreign trade.
As can be seen from above, while JFRB was basically reticent
on the seminars on Shanghai's Economic Problems from 1981 onward,
this activity was reported in World Economic Herald, a Shanghai
based economic weekly. Strictly speaking World Economic Herald is
not a regional newspaper, although its base is in Shanghai. The
paper's focus is on the whole country and on economy. As a whole
World Economic Herald has been a pioneer in advocating economic
reforms in China. For example it devoted large coverage to
discussing the formation of Shanghai Economic Zone and attacking
the obstacles posed by tiaotiao and kuaikuai. However, every
issue of World Economic Herald usually devotes two pages covering
news on Shanghai's economic development and more importantly
reporting researches into Shanghai's economic problems and policy
proposals. Therefore, it has in effect become an arena for
pressing for a change in central-Shanghai relations.
In the above paragraphs, we have shown that in 1982 World
Economic Herald had served as an outlet for those ideas expressed
in the Seminars on Shanghai's Economic Problems. Other telling
examples are the analysis of the reasons for the slow progress in
developing new products in Shanghai, 35
the demonstration of the
contradiction in technical upgrading and transformation on the one
hand and tight production assignments on the other, 36 the report
of the extremely low level of new products development funds for
Shanghai's industrial enterprises, a call for Shanghai's
industries to undertake structural transformation, form labour and
capital intensive industries to technology-intensive industries,
38
the criticism on the slow improvement of the livelihood of the
people and particularly the desperate housing problem in Shanghai.
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Many reports in the pages devoting to covering news on
Shanghai's economy had in one way or other pointed to central-
Shanghai relations, which had been identified as the source of
many economic or other problems in Shanghai. Shen Junbor and Chu
Zhengyi authored a column The Business way of the Old Shanghai
(Jiu Shanghai Shengyijing), describing how the prosperous business
was carried out in Shanghai before it was turned into mainly an
industrial city. They explicitly advocated that experience of the
past could be used for reference. This view is consistent with
their suggestion in other place that Shanghai should in the first
place be a multifunctional municipality, instead of merely an
industrial base.
It does not however necessarily mean that World Economic
Herald had purposively served as a tool for advancing local
interests. It might very well be the case that since it was less
controlled by the party and less sensitive that those ideas
advancing for local interests were allowed to publish and to reach
the policy-makers and society at large.__________
Apart from the public arenas, there are some visible
instances that the local interests were brought to bear directly
upon the policy-making process. It has been shown before that the
seminars on Shanghai's economic problems probably had had some
important policy-making roles because the Planning and Economic
Commissions were actively involved. It has also been shown that in
1982, the discussion was tied to the drafting of the municipal's
Sixth Five-Year Plan and the adoption of the strategy of
Squeezing out, internal combination, transformation and
Development (Waiji Neilian, Gaizao, Kaifa) in April 1983. In what
follow, we identify one further arena for local interest
articulation that had probably shaped policy-making.
We have indicated that in September 1984 a Conference on the
Strategy and Tactics of Shanghai's Economic Development was held
in Shanghai to confirm and publicize the central government's
decision to renovate Shanghai. What had occurred prior to this
instance was more important in terms of local interest
articulation, both because these might well be the input having
certain impact on the policy decided consequently and because
these actions before the policy was made possessed certain degree
of independence. In early 1984, Shanghai was obviously on the
process of drafting its economic development strategy, and during
this process, the local elite appeared to have made some impact.
In April 1984, the municipal Planning Commission, Shanghai
Economic Research Centre and Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences
42 organized a conference on Shanghai's economic development
strategy which unlike the September one was attended by the local
people only. This conference was not mentioned in the press, but
it does not mean that this was unimportant. It was kept obscured
because this was in the process of policy deliberation. The
research group on Shanghai economic development strategy under the
Institute of Sectoral Economy of Shanghai Academy of Social
Sciences presented a series of research reports in the September
Conference. The main report is The Choice of Shanghai's Economic
Development Strategic Goal. In light of the development later,
the April conference and the research reports by this Research
group seemed to have been given a prominent role in policy-making.
In August this year Shanghai was called to report to the Central
Finance and Economic Leading Group and the State Council on
Shanghai's economic works. This might very well be the
occasion that the municipal leadership made some demands on the
central government regarding the problem of renovating shanghai.
And it seems highly reasonable to think that the conference held
earlier in April and the research reports was to help formulate
the demands and furnish much of the substance of the arguments
delivered to the central government in August. And it is worthy to
note that the final settlement was approved in the form of a
report outline submitted by the municipal government, which
implied some initiatives on the part of the municipal government
and the proponents of local interest also.
The report made to the central government appeared to serve
as the basis for negotiating and finalizing the scope of power to
be decentralized to Shanghai in the following several months. In
September and October, a State Council research group on
transforming and renovating Shanghai was sent to Shanghai to help
study Shanghai's economic development strategy. Later, Zhao
Ziyang, accompanied by Vice Premier Yao Yilin and other central
government officials came to Shanghai to study the
transformation and renovation of Shanghai, and the necessary
power, policy and conditions for achieving strategic changes [in
economic development]. Many of the ideas expressed over the
previous years by the local elites were then authoritatively
included in Zhao Ziyang's important instruction. 46 The
substantive arrangement was formally arrived in February 1985 when
the Report Outline on the Strategy of Shanghai's Economic
47
Development was approved by the State Council.
(2) Issues
Interest articulation activities in Shanghai focused on a
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wide range of issues. For the sake of presentation, they can be
grouped into two categories. One of this is concerned with
Shanghai's economic development strategy. The other is on
improving the quality of life in Shanghai.
There are then two dimensions of Shanghai's economic
development strategy, the structure of industry and the structure
of the whole economy of which industry is only a part. It was
widely complained that both Shanghai's industrial structure and
economic structure were fundamentally flawed: most of Shanghai's
industries were labour-intensive and raw material intensive
industries and of the whole economic structure, industrial
production weighted too heavily while the tertiary sector was
underdeveloped. It was therefore demanded that Shanghai should
move to higher level of industrial activities and at the same time
the tertiary sector should have faster development. Instead of
being just an industrial city, Shanghai should become an economic
centre, playing multi-functions.
The demands for improving the quality of life in Shanghai
were simple. They argued that Shanghai should undertake more
municipal service and public utilities projects to reimburse the
debts incurred since the late 1950s (see Table 3.1).
More concrete demands flow from these broad and general
arguments. Firstly, the central government was urged to change the
yardsticks measuring Shanghai's economic contribution. Chen Minzhi
wrote to Sun Yefang in 1979 that Shanghai should be evaluated not
by the volume of goods it sent to other regions or the revenue it
sent to the central government, but in terms of its role in
upgrading the technical and managerial level of the inefficient
enterprises in other parts of China. Similar argument was
frequently repeated in Shanghai. Later, it was argued that Gross
National Product should be introduced to replace industrial output
value and revenue as measurement of Shanghai1s economic
performance.
Corollary, it was demanded that Shanghai's output target and
profit target burden should be substantially reduced. The slow
progress in upgrading technical level, increasing the proportion
of new and more advanced products and the failure of increasing
export were usually attributed to the profit and output value
pressure. The practice of raising the targets for output value and
profit every year, and keeping the industrial enterprises busy
fulfilling these targets was criticised for their detriment to the
long term objectives of rationalizing the industrial and the
economic structure. Therefore, contrary to the central
government's insistence that Shanghai's economy should keep on
growing at a certain rate, it was argued that Shanghai's economy
should be slowed down. The local elites maintained that although
as a result of this Shanghai's output value and profit would
likely to fall temporarily, it would enable it to make greater
contribution in the future.
The third specific demand made by the local elites was
concerned with the distribution of Shanghai's revenue. It was
complained that Shanghai's share was too small and it should be
allowed to keep a larger share. It was explicitly requested that
Shanghai should be left with more finance to let the municipal
government undertake projects to improve municipal construction
and housing construction, and improve the quality of life.
Moreover, more municipal financial power was also considered
necessary for the tertiary sector to develop faster.
An interesting point about interest articulation in Shanghai
during this period is that more investment was not the issue. In
fact, as indicated before, the central government had assigned
many investment projects in Shanghai since the late 1970s, the
famous Baoshan Steel Mill is only the most typical example. In
fact, because of the efficiency and the quick return of investment
in Shanghai, the central government had assigned too many
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investments in Shanghai. This seemed to have not welcome by the
local elites because they further increase the difficulties in
housing and in municipal services encountered by Shanghai. Instead
of demanding for more investment, the focus of interest
articulation had been mainly on the direction of how the available
resource should be used and the conditions that would help this
resource to move in this desirable direction.
(3) Summary and Analysis
Both because other forms of interest articulation are
unlikely to occur frequently and also because we are left to what
were reported in the local press, this chapter only focus on the
expression of ideas and formulation of policy recommendations. The
examination of the arenas of interest articulation is also limited
to the more open and the less formal ones. These limitations
should be noted to emphasize the limited scope of this research.
We have seen in this chapter that local interest articulation
occur in several arenas, the most important of which is probably
the semi-formal meetings to discuss Shanghai's economic problems
participated by both intellectuals and practitioners. The open
expression of ideas and policy suggestions which were not entirely
consistent with the current emphasis of the central government the
press is not uncommon during this period. Moreover, interest
articulations were also evident in the largely behind-the-scene
process of policy deliberation, such as the drafting of the
municipal's Sixth and Seventh Five-year Plans in 1982 and 1983,
and the drafting of Shanghai's new economic development strategy
in 1984. In other words, the involvement of the local actors in
formulating economic policy gave them opportunities to articulate
for local interest.
Although we choose to describe interest articulation in
Shanghai as a tendency of articulation, it can be seen from the
discussion in this chapter that there was a certain degree of
coordination in the efforts to articulate local interest, as
suggested by the heavy involvement of the such units as Shanghai
Economic Research Centre and the Institute of Sectoral Economy of
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences.
While the impact on policy outcomes of this tendency of
articulation would be left to be discussed in next chapter, it
should be noted that these instances of articulation are likely to
have other unintended consequences. It is obvious that interest
articulation in the local level aimed at changing the very
unfavorable relationship between the central government and
Shanghai. However, like all other social actions, it tended to
have unintended effects. It can be hypothesized that interest
articulation helped create some collective sense in Shanghai,
although it is very difficult to show this was really the case.
Interest articulation is here defined as the communication of
expectation and ideas within a group of people and we have seen
that certain acts in Shanghai in the early 1980s did demonstrate
this character. Occasionally, ideas and policy recommendations
were allowed to communicated to the member of the community,
through academic journal, and to a lesser extent, through
newspaper. They then elicited exciting responses from the members
of the community. Although it is too much to suggest that a group
had formed as a result, this is the very stuff for group
formation. As such, this process would likely to have far more
impact on central-Shanghai relationship than the issu.es at stake.
It is interesting to note that while the appearance of local
interest articulation in Shanghai presupposes certain degree of
grievances at the local level, the very acts of articulation
tended to increase such feelings in Shanghai. This is perhaps why
David Truman considered interaction (and interest articulation)
was needed to turn a categoric group into a analytic group in
politics.
CHAPTER FIVE
AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF LOCAL INTEREST ARTICULATION
The existence of interest articulation does not necessarily
mean that it has impact on policy. It is very common that some
interests articulated by certain groups of people are not been
incorporated in government policies. Even in the pluralist
political systems where particularistic interests are more
legitimate, it is impossible to heed to all demands made upon the
government. Because communist political systems follow different
political principles, they do not feel the morale impulse for
responding to the interests expressed by the individuals and
groups as in pluralist political systems. 1 Therefore, it is more
necessary to make a distinction between the existence of interest
articulation and its impact. Even when interest articulation does
not have significant impact on policy outcomes, it is still an
interesting area for political analysis. On the other hand,
whether local interest articulation has impact on policy-making
and what kinds of impact it has are important for understanding
2
how power is distributed and exercised in Chinese politics.
(1) Problems of Measurement
This chapter tries to suggest some propositions about the
impact of local interest articulation in Shanghai. Three
qualifications should be emphasized in order to underscore the
limitation of this attempt. First, given the inferential nature of
the available data, our conclusions cannot be anything but
inconclusive. Their validity remains to be tested by more vigorous
research making use of more direct data. Furthermore, the
propositions should be formulated in a very general way. Thirdly,
even our analysis of the impact of local interest articulation on
policy outcomes is true, its implication for the overall spatial
distribution of power in China remains to be interpreted, given
the uniqueness of this case.
The problems of measurements should be dealt with in the
first place. Essentially, under what circumstances will we
consider local interest articulation to have impact on policy
outcomes. This is a far more complex problem than what first meets
the eyes. The ideal situation in which such a point can be
established would be one in which the two actors have clearly
conflicting interests, and if one actor is able to change another
actor's original position in the way he likes, we would be able to
say that this actor has some influence on the other over certain
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issues. The empirical measurement of influence is such
difficult that even in relatively open systems the necessary
requirements cannot be satisfied. It is generally recognized that
the demanding requirements for studying power are rarely met in
4
most political analysis.
In a less than ideal situation, process analysis and direct
evidences are usually substituted by comparing demands before a
decision is made with the content of the decision. If it is
demonstrated that policy changes as what a political action has
demanded, it is thought to be reasonable to postulate that this
political action has certain impact on what to have occurred
afterward. In the studies of communist politics, such strategy has
been widely employed. 5
Superficially, this strategy seems to
satisfy the properties of the existence of power relation set down
by Dahl. However, short of direct access to the policy-making
process, there is limitations in employing this strategy. 8 For
instance, without adequate knowledge of the policy-making process,
it would be difficult to know exactly and precisely the sequence
of actions leading to a decision. In such a situation, it is
equally difficult to know whether there really areconnections
between the actions we are interested in and the policy outcomes.
Finally, it is possible that even the first two conditions are
met, the policy outcomes can be caused by other factors, not the
variables we are thinking of. I do not mean that these
difficulties can be overcome here, but they should be identified
to suggest the possible problems of the following analysis.
Theoretically speaking, some of these methodological
fallacies, however, can be reduced in a conflict situation. The
strategy of comparing the demands prior to a decision and the
content of the decision is most useful when two actors are clearly
in conflict.8 At least, it increases the possibility that the
dependent variable is really influenced by the independent one. On
the other hand, power relation is most difficult to demonstrate
when the actors concerned cannot be demonstrated to have opposing
interests. However, this condition does not fit the reality of
Chinese politics. When the central government is firm in an issue,
there is no room for local interest articulation and no room for
the exercise of local power. Other researches have suggested that
the degree of power from below is a function of politics at the
central leve As suggested in Chapter Two, the central
government to Shanghai had been marked by ambivalence and this
worked to encourage local interest articulation in Shanghai. This
means that a clear conflict situation does not exist, which in
turn renders the following effort of assessing the impact of local
interest articulation more problematic.
With all these methodological warnings, we can now proceed to
assess the impact of the local interest articulation in Shanghai.
Its impact will be demonstrated in two ways, each has its own
methodological defects. First, the chain of events will be
described to highlight the possible linkage among them, and
discuss what implication it might have. Second, the concerns and
suggestions raised in Shanghai will be compared with the changes
finally made with regard to Shanghai's economic development
strategy and central-Shanghai relations. The former is concerned
with the temporal dimension, while the latter is concerned with
the substance of the policy, which taken together hopefully will
shed some light on the types of the impact of local interest
articulation in Shanghai.
(2) Chain of events
We first focus our attention on the events in 1979 and 1980.
The most typical case of local interest articulation is the
publication of Shen Junbor's article in Jiefang Ribao in October.
However, this outspoken expression of local interests was preceded
by an article in Renmin Ribao in April on many problems in
Shanghai's economy written by the Economic Structure Research
Group under the State Council, and it is reasonable to think that
what happened in October in Shanghai was encouraged by the open
acknowledgement of the problems in Shanghai's economy by the
central party newspaper and by a group from the central
government. This evidently implies that the local initiative was
not totally independent. This sequence of events would also
implies that what had occurred in the local level did not have
important impact. However, further enquiry does not support this
view. Surely, it would be inconceivable that what had happened in
October in Shanghai would have happened had RMRB not published a
piece of article on this problem earlier. But local interest
articulation began much earlier (in July 1979) in the Seminars on
Shanghai's Economic Problems and in Social Sciences. What is more,
a close reading of the RMRB article by the State Council group
reveals that the ongoing discussion in Shanghai had found their
way into the ideas finally expressed by the group. It is
interesting to note that most of the ideas in the article were
said to have been suggested by the Shanghai comrades. (Of course,
it is possible that this was merely a protective tactics to shift
responsibility.) If this is really the case, it is possible to say
that the local interest articulation in 1979 and 1980 has some
important impact by arousing the attention of the central policy¬
makers. This was accomplished through shaping the views of the
central group sent to Shanghai to investigate economic problems.
If the problems was not to be tackled immediately, the research
group has obviously called the attention of the policy-makers and
put the Shanghai problem up to the agenda. In this sense, local
interest articulation in 1979 and 1980 should be seen as having
impact by shaping the agenda setting process.
It is also interesting to note what had occurred after the
debate on What is meant by ten No. 1 and five No. 1 from the
bottom in October 1980. There are some evidences indicating that
the central government did respond to this expression of interests
and demands, if not in real policy then symbolically. For example,
although the policy of ensuring a growth rate of 4% and seeking
that of 5% was not particularly a low target for Shanghai and was
by no means a concrete measure to solve the problems facing
Shanghai, when it was disclosed it was nevertheless
presented in such a fashion that appeared to be such a remedial
measure. From the way it was presented, one should get the
impression that the central government decided to take determined
measures to correct the imbalance in Shanghai's economy.
However, given that Shanghai's growth rates were generally lower
than the national average, this target did not mean a lighter
load for Shanghai. But the fact it was found necessary to give
such a false impression was in itself indicative. And in the first
quarter of 1981, Shanghai's industrial output value was about the
same level of 1980, largely due to a sizeable falling of heavy
industry. The continuity of the policy and in fact the
unprecedented emphasis on tapping latent potentials in Shanghai
during 1981, however, should be seen in terms of the mounting
financial difficulty of the central government during this
critical period. And it seems obvious that this was a short term
measure. This might very well be the case that while the Shanghai
problem had been put up to agenda, the deallocation of Chinese
national economy prevented the central leaders from taking more
concrete measures to solve it. To judge simply from the degree of
policy change immediately afterward ends to understate the impact
of local interest articulation.
Another piece of evidence also gives support to this view. In
early 1980, the Party centre and the State Council called the
whole nation to learn from Shanghai. While this measure might
be an attempt to praise Shanghai's significant contribution to the
central government's finance and to call other regions to follow
in Shanghai's example, it is possible that this was a response
to the grievances expressed earlier in Shanghai. Therefore, this
was followed by the qualification that there existed some
historical conditions that make Shanghai be able to become an
advanced economic, cultural and technology centre. The central
government maintained that Shanghai should not be complacent and
should guard against arrogance and rashness. It appeared that
this message was specifically made for Shanghai. For example, with
the exception of a minor report on March 27, 1981, Renmin Ribao
covered nothing to this effect during March and April 1981. When
the National Industrial and Transport Work Conference was convened
in Shanghai in April, this slogan was not mentioned in the
speeches made by Yuan Baohua and Yao Yilin, Deputy Director of
State Economic Commission and Vice Premier respectively, in the
conference. As a result, it can be hypothesized that this
message serves both as a pacifying measure and one of warning at
the same time. It indicates that the local interest articulation
did get some response from the central government, although it is
more difficult to determine from this event alone the nature of
the response. Again, to judge merely from the change of policy
afterward may understate the degree of the impact of local
interest articulation.
Beginning from 1982, Shanghai was given more favorable
treatment although more determined measures were still to come and
the emphasis during this period was still on tapping latent
potentials and increasing output value. The investment in
technological upgrading and transformation had increased
substantially. Shanghai's industrial enterprises were given
priority and control in importing foreign facilities and
technology. Furthermore, in early 1983, the State Council approved
a request for more autonomy in foreign trade and employment of
foreign capital by the municipal government. It is also worth
noting that although formal arrangement on the respective share of
the central and municipal governments in the Shanghai produced
revenue was arrived at only in early 1985, Shanghai had already
had a better deal in 1984 when the revenue at its disposal rose
from 2.068 and 2.239 billion yuan in 1982 and 1983 respectively
(composing about 10% of the total revenue recorded in Shanghai),
to 3.032 in 1984, accounting for 14% of the total revenue (21.579
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billion) earned in Shanghai this year. The trend was clearly
that Shanghai was allowed to kept an increasing share of what was
earned there. The percentage of Shanghai's national income (Guomin
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Shouru) that used in other regions gradually declined. Of
course at this stage, a large proportion of what was used in
Shanghai, as shown in Chapter Three, was realized in the form of
centrally-controlled investments in Shanghai. Furthermore, the
local elites had different views on the direction to which this
investment should be used. However, we must say that the available
evidence does not permit us to determine whether these
developments had been immediately affected by pressures from below
and whether they were linked to the heightened local interest
articulation in Shanghai during 1979 and 1980.
It can be shown that the decisions taken in late 1984 and
early 1985 were also preceded by some important events in
Shanghai. We have stated in the above that the local elites
continued to discuss the problems in Shanghai's economy and they
continued to make many policy proposals. With the passage of time,
their views on Shanghai's economic strategy had become more
concrete and substantive. In 1979 and 1980, it was often vaguely
argued that the imbalances in Shanghai's economic development
needed to be corrected, and the comprehensive development of all
industries was not in Shanghai's comparative advantage and had
created many serious difficulties for production as well as for
the people's livelihood. During the intervening period, the local
elites had found time to sharpen their arguments and put them in
better shape. As indicated before, the Institute of Sectoral
Economy of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences had formally
formed a research group on Shanghai's economic development
strategy. This group obviously had been entrusted with the
responsibility to enrich the arguments advanced before and to
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formulated a more concrete policy proposal. Judging from what
happened later, the view that this research group had had an
important role in the policy-making process was probably not far
off the mark.
As early as June 1983, Chen Minzhi, Deputy Director of the
Institute of Sectoral Economy and the head of the research group,
had formulated a draft of the strategy, which was then modified,
substantiated by more statistics, and was presentedin a more
forceful fashion later. Finally, this research group turned in a
series of reports. The main report was entitled The Choice of
Shanghai's Economic Development Strategy.
The public inauguration of the central government's decision
to transform and renovate Shanghai in September was preceded by a
conference of the local elites organized by the municipal Planning
Commission, Shanghai Economic research Centre and the above
mentioned research group in April. Such an occasion should be seen
as one for the local elite to prepare and formulate their views on
Shanghai's economic development strategy to be presented in the
September meeting and to be forwarded to the central government in
the form of the demands of the municipal government. The September
meeting was also preceded by a reports on economic work in
Shanghai by the municipal government to the central government in
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August. Therefore, it is highly probable that the discussion
earlier in Shanghai had made up the substance of the report to the
central government. Obviously, the central government agreed in
principle what was forwarded and asked for by the local elites,
for without this it was hardly necessary to convene a large scale
conference to confirm and publicize the important decision of
the central in September. This sequence of events and the
interpretation offered here, again, tend to lead to a conclusion
that local interest articulation had more than negligible impact
on the policy-making with regard to Shanghai's economic
development strategy.
It should be recalled that the interest articulation during
1979 and 1980 is said before to have had an agenda setting role,
i.e. calling the attention of the central leaders to the problems
in Shanghai. A distinct impact can be attributed to the interest
articulation later. Since the issue was then on the agenda, the
crucial problem had thus become one of shaping how this issue was
to be tackled. While it is impossible to determine from the
available evidence the exact impact of local interest articulation
on central government's decision to pick up the Shanghai problems,
it can be demonstrated that the final shape of the policy had been
influenced by the local initiative.
This can be substantiated in two ways. Firstly, it can be
demonstrated by the importance of the local initiative in the
policy-making process. This will be taken up in next paragraph.
Furthermore, this point can also be shown by comparing the policy
proposals advanced in Shanghai with the contents of the policy
finally adopted. If the policy contents bear close resemblance to
the demands advanced before, we have strong reason to think that
the former was influenced by the latter. This is the subject for
next section.
The policy-making process suggests that the local initiative
had played important role in supplying the central policy-makers
with information, analysis on Shanghai's economic difficulties as
well as proposals on where Shanghai's economy should go. Before
the central government finally took up this issue, the local
elites appeared to have already prepared and formulated a
substantive scheme on Shanghai's economic development strategy.
The events in Shanghai prior to the central government's decision
should be seen in this light. This was most vividly demonstrated
in the systematic arguments in a report prepared by the research
group of the Institute of Sectoral Economy. In this report, three
schemes of economic development and industrial development were
assessed with regard to their economic rationality and their
implication for raw materials and fuel. Because Wang Daohan openly
acknowledged that these researches and proposals was to help the
municipal government to draft Shanghai's economic development
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strategy, they should be taken as forming the main part of the
proposals of the municipal government. Moreover, that the
proposals from the municipal level served as a basis for central-
local negotiation was revealing. It seemed to be the case that
when the central government decided to deal with the issue, the
municipal government was called to submit a proposal. This in part
can be seen as a set of demands made by the municipal government
on the measures necessary for the renovation and transformation of
Shanghai. It was probably inevitable that the central government
should rely on the information and the proposals sent from below,
in view of the relative advantageous position of the municipal
government in terms of its knowledge on what was going on as well
as the needs of the municipal level. When the decision was
promulgated by the State Council in early 1985, it was put as the
approval of the State Council on a outline of report submitted by
the municipal government. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that
the final shape of the decision was heavily influenced by the
information and arguments supplied from below.
However, this is by no means conclusive. If this was the
case, we might be able to find some close resemblance between the
demands and the suggestion from below and the final shape of the
policy. It is to this we turn below.
(3) Comparing Demands with the Content of the Policy
To simplify our task, it is necessary in the first place to
explicate the main proposals made in Shanghai before the decision
was reached in late 1984 and early 1985. The basic reference will
be the The Choice of the Goals of Shanghai's Economic Development
Strategy prepared by the research group of the Institute of
Sectoral Economy, although other sources as relevant can be drawn
also. On the other hand, as the whole document submitted by the
municipal government and approved by the State Council is not
available, we have to glean the major points of the policy from
diverse sources. Apart from the portion of the document that
appears in Shanghai Economy, 1983-85, Zhao Ziyang's instruction in
December 1984 when he and other State Council officials visited
Shanghai can also be an authoritative source for the policy
contents. Such a comparison is partial in character because
data on both the concrete demands from below and the detailed part
of the policy was not disclosed.
The requests as enclosed in The Choice of the Goals of
Shanghai's Economic Development Strategy are manifolds. Some of
them are directed at the goals of Shanghai's economic development
while the others are concerned with the measures needed to enable
these chosen goals to materialize. As to the former, The following
points can be generalized. (1) It was maintained that Shanghai
should not be an industrial base alone. On the contrary, it should
aim at becoming a multifunctional city (an economic centre) and
performing such invaluable functions as providing trade,
financial, technology, information and consultation services.
Particularly, it was insisted that the tertiary sector should have
a faster development. By year 2,000, its share in the total
national income should be about 35%. (2) It was demanded that
Shanghai's industrial development should shift from the current
reliance on the input of material resource for growth to an
emphasis on the advance of technology. This in turn required the
development of new industries and the accelerate the
transformation of the old industries. It was said that Shanghai by
year 2,000, the structure of Shanghai's industry should be
radically changed. (3) To enable Shanghai to transform its
industrial structure, it was insisted that Shanghai should be
relieved from the heavy pressure in traditional industries, and
Shanghai output value and profit should be allowed to fall
temporarily. (4) To enable Shanghai to realize the purposes of
becoming a multifunctional city and developing its tertiary
sector, the major criterion for Shanghai's contribution should be
its Gross National Product instead of the conventional total
industrial and agricultural output value and profit. (5) It was
also stated that the most necessary conditions should be given to
ensure the achievement of the above goals. These conditions were
said to be: a) enhancing the autonomy of the basic enterprises; b)
giving the municipal government relative autonomy in the financial
front (e.g. letting the municipal level have more stable finance
and in securing funds for local construction etc.) and c) giving
the municipal government more autonomy and flexibility in such
areas as taxation, credit and loans and determining prices.
Compared to the provisions enclosed in the outline of report
approved by the State Council in February 1985, we find that most
of these demands have become part of the policy, although it
should be noted that under these general principles there are
still large room for disagreements. And it is possible that many
disagreements between the municipal and central levels were buried
under these superficial similarities. However, these
notwithstanding, the close resemblance of the basic goals is still
an interesting evidence for assessing the impact of local interest
articulation.
Firstly, both Zhao Ziyang's instruction in Shanghai in late
1984 and the outline of report stated that shanghai should aim at
becoming a multifunctional cities and the development of its
tertiary sector should be given a boost. For example it was said
in the outline of report that the raw materials and energy
intensive industries should be readjusted or transferred to the
outlying regions to give rooms for accelerating the development of
the tertiary sector. The transformation of Shanghai's industrial
structure, more specifically, great development of new and
advanced industries and faster transformation of old industries,
was also made as one of the major measures to renovate Shanghai.
It was furthermore stated that in evaluating Shanghai's
economic work, it is not adequate to evaluate merely the growth
rate of its industrial and agricultural output value. Rather, it
is necessary to take its contribution to the services to the four
modernizations of the whole country, and the growth of rate of its
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Gross National Product as major indicators. As a result, the
goal of Shanghai's economic development in 2,000 should be the
quadrupling of its Gross National Product not the quadrupling of
its total industrial and agricultural value. 27 Of more
importance, it was explicitly confirmed that the immediate tasks
in Shanghai were to put the economy in good order, and the growth
rate of Shanghai's output value during the Seventh Five Year Plan
period should base on the principle of seeking the truth from
fact, and the maximization of the output value should be based on
the premise that it would ensure the realization of the
transformation of economic development strategy. Those industries
and products which were poor in terms of macro economic results
and development prospects,should not be preserved just for the
sake of pursuing the doubling of output value in 1990 and should
not be allowed to inhibit the realization of the strategic goals.
28
As part of this scheme, the central-Shanghai financial
relations had been changed in favour of Shanghai. A new system of
financial management was devised and to be applied. This amounts
to allowing Shanghai some autonomy in using its revenue and at the
same time greatly increased the amount to be left to the municipal
finance. In numerical term, Shanghai's share in the total revenue
produced in Shanghai had been almost doubled, from just above 10%
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previously to 23.2% in 1985. Although the new system of
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financial was not immediately followed, in 1985 Shanghai's was
nevertheless given the main benefit of the new system. This is
indicated by the substantial increase of municipal government
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expenditure in 1985.
These similarities notwithstanding, there are also some
differences between the contents of The Choice of Strategic Goals
in Shanghai's Economic Development and the Outline of Report.
The first major difference is that the outline of report expected
(or required) the tertiary industry to grow faster. While it was
stated in the former report that by 2,000 the share of the
tertiary sector in Shanghai's Gross National Product should reach
35%, in the outline of report this level would be reached by 1,990
and by 2,000, the percentage of the tertiary sector would reach
50-60%. Second, the original report had a more specific picture
for the proportion of different industries in Shanghai by 2,000.
For instance, it was said that the new industries based on the
core electronic industries should rise from the existing 4.6% to
20.35% in 2,000, and the technology-intensive processing
industries should grow from the existing 36.7% to 60% in 2,000. On
the other hand, metallugal and textile industries should fall from
the existing 11.07% and 21.3% to 8.8% and 10.4% in 2,000
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respectively. In the outline of report, although the needs for
transforming Shanghai's industrial structure were recognized, no
such detailed projection was made. In particular, the outline of
report seemed to have reservation in letting the textile industry
to fall as far as the original report would like to see.
Therefore, in the outline of report, it was instead maintained
that Shanghai's light and textile industries have conventional
superiority. We should speed up upgrading the class and changing
the generation of old products by using new technology, now
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techniques and new materials, and exploit new products.
The demands that Shanghai should be given greater autonomy in
finance appeared to have not been fully approved. While the new
financial management system has given Shanghai a larger share in
the revenue recorded in Shanghai and more autonomy in the use of
the revenue kept at the municipal level, there was no hint that
the demands for allowing the municipal to cultivate its own bases
of finance had been approved.
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATION
Interest Articulation in Shanghai is examined here to
illustrate (1) the character and the nature of interest
articulation in Chinese politics; and (2) what types of impact
(power) local interest articulation are likely to have and the
conditions under which it can have such impact. This concluding
chapter summarizes the analysis in the former chapters and brings
the empirical studies to bear upon the above two theoretical
questions.
There are several major points so far as the nature and
character of local interest articulation are concerned. First,
there seems to be quite explicit expression of local interest and
demands for more favorable consideration in policy. Sometimes,
such demands were presented in very partisan fashion. While these
might be due to the uniqueness of the issue at hand, as suggested
in section 2 of Chapter three, it might also have a great deal to
do with the tendency to tolerate more open expression of localist
and particular interest in the post-Mao era. It is generally
agreed that relatively open expression and articulation of local
interests becomes more prevalent in China in the post-Mao era. 1
Therefore, the case of Shanghai is not entirely unique.
As suggested by Lynn White, the expression of different ideas
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at the local level represents a kind of local autonomy. In this
sense, this case of interest articulation in Shanghai speaks of
some autonomy in the local level. However, the case for local
autonomy should be qualified in one important way. We have argued
that interest articulation in Shanghai had least partially been
encouraged by the expression of similar concerns at the central
level. Therefore, the causes for local autonomy should at least be
sought in part in the conditions at the central level. This seems
to fit very well to the reality of communist politics where
organizational unity and the authority of the central leaders are
formally and strongly emphasized. While these objectives have
never been fully realized, they do give special quality to
politics in general and to autonomy in particular in communist
states. As Rigby put it succinctly, autonomy at the subsystem
levels in Soviet politics arises by default and not by design: it
tends to be a function of, for examples, the lack of firm
leadership, policy deadlock, factional conflict, or ambivalence at
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the centre. This point has been collaborated by the research on
provincial autonomy in Chinese politics. Goodman found that policy
deviations in Sichuan and Guizhou before the Cultural Revolution
were strictly speaking not deviations at all, because they are
either allowed, explicitly encouraged, or resulted from central
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debates. Lynn White demonstrated that local autonomy in
Shanghai for a brief period during Cultural Revolution should be
understood in terms of the disintegration of central government's
authority. 5
On the other hand, it should also be noted that some
conditions contributing to the existence of local autonomy cannot
be completely eliminated, according to the basic assumptions of
the neo-rational theory of organization and decision-making. It is
held that uncertainty and uncontrolled areas are bound to exist in
organizations and these give rise to autonomy at the subordinate
levels. Central-local relationship can be understood in this
term. While the complete disintegration of central government's
authority as in the Cultural Revolution is certainly an exception,
the existence of some lesser extreme forms of central weakness is
likely to be the norm. This is the essence of complex
organization and it constitutes the basic dynamics of central-
local politics.
Of course, the extent of local interest articulation is also
affected by other variables, among them the degree of local unity
and the issue at stake. In these regards, Shanghai should be
seen as somewhat atypical. Being a municipal, it appears that
Shanghai is more homogeneous and more cohesive than other
provincial units. Moreover, interest articulation in Shanghai has
obviously been shaped by the issue at hand. It can be hypothesized
that interest articulation in China is likely to be more policy
specific because of the lack of more permanent group basis.
This analysis of local interest articulation differs from the
literature on provincial politics in China in that it does not
look at the formal municipal leaders for evidences of interest
articulation. This is based on the understanding that on the one
hand as representatives of the central government in the
localities they are generally less likely to press for local
interests, and on the other hand, given the close nature of their
behaviours, their roles remain largely unresearcheable in so
far as interest articulation is concerned. Therefore, we look at
the less formal actors in this case study. Two points can be noted
from this emphasis. First, it points generally to the
methodological importance of studying the less formal actors in
Chinese politics, especially in local politics. Second, as a
result of our focus on just the less formal aspects, we should
emphasize that there were probably other forms of interest
articulation activities both over the issue examined here and in
Chinese politics generally.
Although it is not suggested by the empirical evidences in
this research, interest articulation can be regarded as having
unintended consequences. It might be thought as helping to create
a common consciousness within the community, although the exact
impact in this regard cannot be specified. In this way, interest
articulation should have more political importance than its
immediate impact on the policy issue at stake. It might probably
have some effect on the perception of the people on central
government and Shanghai's role in China, which in turn might
seriously affect central-Shanghai relationship in the future.
The analysis of the impact of interest articulation in
Shanghai over central-Shanghai economic relationship also helps us
to understand what kinds of impact local interest articulation has
on policy-making and the conditions in which it can exercise such
impact. To deal with the former aspect, Dahl's idea that power
should be seen in terms of its domain and scope is particularly
useful. In keeping with this formulation, the power over a policy
should be disaggregated into several dimensions. We have tried to
specify that local interest articulation in Shanghai has probably
shaped policy-making in two ways: by shaping the perceptions of
the central leaders on Shanghai's situation and pushing the issue
up to the agenda, and by formulating systematic and sophisticated
policy proposals and shaping the content of the policy.
This view of the influence of local interest articulation
again is consistent with the conclusions of organizational
theorists on the flows of influence within an organization. In
fact, it takes us back to a classical modification of Weber ideal-
type organization. On the basis of the assumption of full-fledged
rationalization, Weber suggests that authority in organization
flows only from top down. However, it is now generally agreed the
basic assumption upon which this proposition is rested is very
problematic. Full rationalization is found to be an unrealistic
objective. Weber's theory of organization has been modified in
g
many ways. One of the modifications is that hierarchy and
expertise tend to diverge, giving rise to a constant source of
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tension in organization life. Authority resides as much with
expertise as with hierarchy. The influence of interest
articulation examined in this case can be seen as deriving from
expertise. Influence stemming from the better control of
information and familiarity with policy situation at the lower
levels can also be understood in terms of authority of expertise.
It is from this angle that influence of the less formal actors in
the policy-making process should been generally appreciated.
This also brings us to the conditions under which local
interest articulation from below exercise influence upon policy¬
making. The impact of local interest articulation as examined in
last chapter should be understood in a situation when the central
government was in a state of indecision, as suggested in Chapter
two. Such case should be distinguished from open non-conformity
and direct confrontation with the central level. To begin with the
central government seemed to have very ambivalent attitude toward
Shanghai and this not only gave rise to local interest
articulation, but allowed it to shape policy in a significant way.
What we have said about the conditions for the emergence of
interest articulation above can be repeated here. Again, similar
conditions at the centre should not be thought as unusual or
exceptional. To a very significant sense, as the organization
theorists suggest, such conditions are bound to exist. Local power
in affecting policy-making at the central level should also be
seen within this framework. 11
TABLES
Table 2.1 Shanghai's Share of National Gross Value of Industrial
Output, 1949-1985
1949 1952 1957 1965 1970 1977 1982 1983 1985
21% 19% 16% 17% 14% 14% 11.3% 10.6% 10%
Sources: Howe. 1980, in Howe ed., p.159
Shanghai Economy, 1949-82, p.1238
Shanghai Tongji Nianjian, 1983, p.33
Zhong Guo Tongji Nianjian, 1986, p.51
Table 2.2 Share of State Revenue Directly Collected by the
Central Government and Share of Central Government's
Expenditure in State Revenue, various years
Period Direct Central
Revenue(%)
Local Revenue Expenditure of
Central Government










































Note: 1.5, 2.5... refer to the First Five Year Plan period, the
Second Five Year Plan Period ...etc.
Source: Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian, 1986, p.611




















Source: a. Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian, 1986, p. 611
b. Calculated from Shanghai Economy, 1983-85, p.1037. The
figures in this column is derived by deducing
Shanghai's local expenditure from total municipal revenue.




















Note: The share of Shanghai's contribution as presented here may
have been exaggerated because some of the revenue remitted
by Shanghai (tax) might belong to the category of centrally
collected revenue. Therefore, probably as a result of the
introduction of tax for profit (yishui daili) scheme in
1983, the share of centrally collected revenue increased from
23% in 1982 to 29.8% in 1983. This explains why in our method of
calculation, the percentage for 1983 is particularly high.
These notwithstanding, it is still undeniably true that
Shanghai's remitted revenue made up a particularly important
part of the revenue remitted by all other provincial units.
Source: a. See Table 2.3a
b. This is calculated by deducing from the total central
expenditure the revenue directly collected by the
central government. Zhongguo Tong.ji Nianjian, 1986,
p.611.






























Sources: Zhongguo Tong.ji Nianjian, 1986, p.45
Shanghai Shengli De Shinian, p.133




































Sources: Shanghai Tongji Nianjian, 1983, p.266 for Shanghai's
export figures before 1983.
Almanac of China's Foreign Relations and Trade, 1986,
p.966 for 1984-5 figures of Shanghai's export.
Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian. 1986, p.563 for the national
total.
Table 2.6 Shanghai's Industrial Output Value and Municipal































shanghai Economy 1983-85, p.109, p.829, p.1037.
Note: a. There are two different sets of data on municipal revenue for
Shanghai. One is called all municipal revenue (chuanshi
caizheng shouru) and the other is called local revenue
(difang caizheng shouru). The former probably refers to
revenue recorded by all units within the administrative
area of Shanghai (including the zhongyang qiye located
in Shanghai) and the latter only refers to local
enterprises (difang qiye). See Donnithrone 1981, for
such a distinction. It is also necessary to distinguish
between revenue from industrial enterprises only and
revenue from all local sources. It appears that the
former declined faster than the latter. See JFRB, 22-7-
1983, p.l; 19-10-1983, p.l. Therefore, the figures in this
table may very well understate the severity of
Shanghai's situation.
b. 1985 was a very unusual year in China and in Shanghai.
See for example, Shanghai Economy, 1983-5, p.99; WEH, 31-
3-1986, p.14; ibid, 7-4-1986, p.2. Local revenue sloped
back roughly to the level of 1984 in 1987. See RMRB, 4-3-
1988:1.
c. Although no exact data on 1981 and 1982 is available, it
was nevertheless stated that local revenue showed a
downward trend in these two years. See Shanghai Economy,
1983-85, p.829.

















Source: Shanghai Shengli de Shinian, p.140
Note: a. These are actual investments and include investment by
the enterprises using their own retained funds. Moreover,
it was widely reported that some of these investments
were in actual capital investment. These points should be
kept in mind on interpreting these figures. However, it
unambiguously indicates that investment in Shanghai has
persistently on the increase. Therefore, if the small
amount of investment were the only concern in the municipal
level, there would be no point for complaint. Obviously,
as to be discussed later, the local elites were not so
much interested in securing more investments for
Shanghai as securing a new definition of how these monies
should be used.
Table 2.8 State Revenue and Expenditure. 1979-85


































Source: China Statistics Yearbook, 1986, p.595.
Table 3.1 Proportion of Non-production Investment and
Investment in Municipal Service and Public Utilities
in Total Investment in Shanghai, Various Periods
Period % of
non-production investment
% of investment in municipal
























Source: Luncaizheng Fenpei..., pp.172-3.
Shanghai Shengli de Shinian, p.53, p.141
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